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LESSONS FOR COMPETITION LAW  
FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS:  
THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES TO 
THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PHENOMENON 
 
Jesse W. Markham, Jr.*
“[If] the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop 
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the 
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants 
that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in 
economic affairs . . . .”  
 
—Robert Pitofsky1
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust law 
could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-big-
to-fail problem.  The article begins by exploring the nature of the 
problem. Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and 
rules to evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role.  The 
article concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an 
emphasis on avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful 
public policy tool to address the problem.  However, it can come 
nowhere near solving it or preventing recurrences of recent systemic 
failures. 
 
* Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law, The University of San Francisco School of 
Law.  A version of this article was presented by the author at the Murphy Conference 
on Corporate Law at Fordham University Law School, March 12, 2010.  The author 
wishes to express his gratitude to many who contributed to the research and writing of 
this article in a variety of capacities.  Professor Steven Schatz graciously reviewed an 
early stage of the article.  Robin Bennett provided invaluable background research.  The 
University of San Francisco School of Law provided generous support for this project 
and the law faculty, in numbers too great to thank here individually, offered insightful 
suggestions at a presentation based on a formative draft. 
 1. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 
1051 (1979). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust 
law could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-big-
to-fail problem.  The article begins by exploring the nature of the 
problem.  Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and rules to 
evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role.  The article 
concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an emphasis on 
avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful public policy tool to 
address the problem.  However, it can come nowhere near solving it or 
preventing recurrences of recent systemic failures.  The narrowed focus 
antitrust developed under the influence of the Chicago School greatly 
limits its potential utility in this context and it is worth serious 
reconsideration.  Nevertheless, the dynamism of antitrust policy in 
adjusting to intellectual movements and economic conditions could be 
harnessed to re-establish the broad reach of antitrust and thus forge a 
reasonably useful public policy weapon to direct at the too-big-to-fail 
problem.  Antitrust law could make a greater contribution in resolving 
this public policy problem if Congress enacted or the judiciary forged 
more robust rules preventing and dismantling unwieldy corporate size in 
excess of any plausible scale efficiency justification.  Such rules would 
be consistent with the historic purposes of antitrust law: to protect 
consumers against the output, innovation and price effects of 
catastrophic failures. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the thesis here is not that 
antitrust law, even if more vigorously interpreted and enforced, could 
have made much difference in averting any part of the recent global 
financial crisis.  There is no real consensus about the causes of that 
crisis, but recent changes in the business of global banking and finance 
beyond the mere size of financial enterprises contributed to a systemic 
weakness, rather than isolated weakness in one or a few participants.  
When Bear Stearns was rescued, the intent presumably was to prevent 
that domino from toppling into others and knocking down too many 
others.  Since holding that domino upright did not prevent systemic 
failure, it seems probable that the causes do not merely reside in one or a 
few too-big-to-fail enterprises, but, rather, underlie the system. 
Nevertheless, there remains an important public policy issue 
regarding whether to permit firms to combine where the resulting 
enterprise exceeds efficient scale and at the same time escapes failure by 
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being too-big-to-fail.  If the out-sized firm is not allowed to fail, then 
allowing it to exist creates a risk to the economy and the treasury.  If no 
offsetting benefit exists, the question then becomes whether there exists 
an administratively practical way for antitrust law to help contain the 
size of such enterprises. 
This article presupposes the existence of some enterprises in key 
sectors of our economy whose scale exceeds optimal efficient levels, but 
that are too big to allow them to fail.  These are arguable assumptions 
that I leave to others to argue about. This article does not seek to resolve 
those empirical questions, but, rather, to explore whether antitrust should 
play a role in controlling the too-big-to-fail problem if these assumptions 
are accurate. 
A. THE PARADOX OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL AND ANTITRUST 
It seems paradoxical that antitrust law appears to have had nothing 
to say about the problem of firms becoming too big to fail.  The antitrust 
laws are uniquely addressed to the problem of maintaining healthy 
markets against distortion from excessive aggregations of economic 
power.  Yet, antitrust law has not intervened to prevent or redress the 
recent outbreak of systemic threats caused directly by companies that are 
too big and too integral to the functioning of markets to allow those 
firms to function normally without massive governmental infusions of 
capital.  In some instances, these companies have accumulated assets 
exceeding $1 trillion,2 and they cut across a broad swath of economic 
activity, including investment banking,3 depositary banking,4 insurance,5
 
 2. As of September 30, 2008, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) 
reported assets exceeding $1 trillion.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: RESTRUCTURING OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 1 (2008), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/CongressionalReportRestructuringFinal.pdf 
[hereinafter AIG REPORT]. 
 
 3. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: BRIDGE 
LOAN TO BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES THROUGH JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearns 
bridgeloan.pdf  [hereinafter BEAR STEARNS REPORT]. 
 4. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the banking operations of 
Washington Mutual Bank in a transaction facilitated by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.  See Press Release, JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of 
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securities,6 mortgage lending,7 and automobile manufacturing.8  All of 
these industries are subject to antitrust law.  Furthermore, nearly all of 
the firms that have been considered too big to fail grew, in large part, by 
acquisition activity that is within the reach of antitrust laws and subject 
to pre-transaction government clearance.9
This paradox begins to unravel when one considers the ever-
narrowing reach of modern antitrust law.  As currently interpreted by the 
courts, U.S. antitrust law is a shadow of its original self.  Whatever 
animated their enactment, antitrust laws no longer concern themselves 
with preventing bigness, and indeed tend instead to encourage large-
scale enterprise for efficiency’s sake.  Beginning with Continental T.V., 
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
  Yet, antitrust laws did 
nothing to intervene to prevent these firms from reaching potentially 
catastrophic dimensions.  The Sherman Act surely was not enacted so 
that firms could become so big, and so economically and politically 
powerful, that the mere possibility of their failure would impose 
unacceptable policy choices on the nation. Why, then, are so many firms 
too big to fail, and why has antitrust not done its part to prevent the 
possibility of these catastrophic failures? 
10
 
Washington Mutual: FDIC Facilitates Transaction that Protects All Depositors and 
Comes at No Cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (Sept. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html. 
 the antitrust laws in the United States began 
a steady process of judicial erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly 
conflicting policy objectives, distilling in their place the exclusive 
purpose of promoting consumer welfare through allocative and dynamic 
 5. AIG REPORT, supra note 3. 
 6. See, BEAR STEARNS REPORT, supra note 4. 
 7. “On Saturday, September 6, 2008, FHFA placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
into conservatorships.” See, Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent 
Regulatory Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban 
Affairs, 110th CONG. 2 (2008) (statement of James B. Lockhart, III, Director, Federal 
Housing Finance Agency), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/120/ 
revisedtestimonySBC102308.pdf. 
 8. Robert Marko, Note, Road Closed: The Inequitable Treatment of Pre-Closing 
Products Liability Claimants Under the Auto Industry Bailout, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 353, 353 (2010). 
 9. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires pre-
transaction notification to the federal antitrust authorities of most mergers and 
acquisitions where the parties and transaction meet certain inflation-adjusted size 
thresholds.  15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). 
 10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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efficiency.  With marginal and mostly theoretical exceptions, the 
efficient allocation of society’s scarce resources through the use of 
existing technologies and the production of goods and services more 
efficiently using innovative new ones, comprise the sum total of the 
residual policy underpinnings of modern antitrust law.11
However, the paradox is not altogether attributable to the narrowing 
focus of modern antitrust law.  Although at one time antitrust law 
  In light of these 
modern movements in antitrust law, it is perhaps not entirely surprising 
that antitrust law has not prevented the too-big-to-fail problem, since 
consumer welfare may be enhanced, rather than harmed, by permitting 
firms to become big and even indispensible. 
 
 11. It has been argued that “[t]o this day, the Supreme Court has not come close to 
saying that economic efficiency is the exclusive concern of the antitrust laws . . .”  
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 69 (3d ed. 2005).  However, no Sherman Act case since Klor’s, Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), has even arguably turned on the 
policies of personal freedom to pursue economic opportunity, or the statutory policy of 
policing fairness in the marketplace, although those policies were frequently echoed in 
early antitrust cases.  Aside from cases decided under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b, 21a (2000), no recent antitrust case turned on the policy of favoring 
small enterprise for its own sake, also frequently given voice on in an early generation 
of Sherman Act decisions.  More to the point, however, there has been an outright 
abandonment of what once was central antitrust policy favoring fragmented markets 
populated by small businesses, even at some expense in the form of efficiency.  Recent 
decisions make no mention of any general antipathy for big business nor preference for 
smaller enterprise, such as Judge Hand invoked in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America:  
“[A]mong the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great 
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them. . 
. . Throughout the history of [the Sherman Act, the Surplus Property Act and the 
Small Business Mobilization Act] it has been constantly assumed that one of their 
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible 
cost, an organization of industry in small unites which can effectively compete 
with each other.” 
148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).  Since Brown Shoe v. United States, there has 
been no serious mention by the high court of any preference for small enterprise for its 
own sake.  370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire 
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned, 
businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result 
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”).  The most recent reference by 
the Supreme Court to the preference for “keeping a large number of small competitors 
in business” was the much excoriated United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 
270, 275 (1966). 
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considered the emergence of very large corporations to present 
unacceptable risks to the public, the risks that were of concern did not 
include the too-big-to-fail problem.  Instead, antitrust law in an earlier 
era was concerned about the threat of harm out-sized enterprise posed to 
others by its sheer power, rather than its vulnerability to collapse.  Thus, 
there remains a perplexing aspect to this paradox: even the more robust 
antitrust regime that was overrun by the modern law and economics 
movement seems to have been unconcerned with preventing systemic 
failure by constraining firms from becoming too big to fail. 
Curiously, though, the older antitrust regime was very much 
concerned with bigness for reasons that apply to the too-big-to-fail firm.  
Before the courts rewrote them, United States antitrust laws were 
understood as providing the public with protection against behemoth 
economic enterprises not only because of their tendency toward market 
dominance, but also because of their power to paralyze or control 
democratic institutions through their vast wealth.  Nearly 100 years ago, 
Justice Harlan described the Sherman Act as arising from a universal 
conviction that “the country was in real danger from another kind of 
slavery . . . that would result from the aggregations of capital in the 
hands of a few.”12
It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain political 
values in interpreting the antitrust laws.  By ‘political values,’ I 
mean, first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power 
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and, second, a desire to 
enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range 
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere 
controls the welfare of all.  A third and overriding political concern 
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop 
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the 
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate 
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more 
intrusive role in economic affairs.
  As recently as 1979, near the onset of the Chicago 
School antitrust revolution, Robert Pitofsky wrote: 
13
Of course, this final prediction could not have been more accurate.  
The ungainly size and perceived indispensability of “too-big-to-fail” 
enterprises has recently forced the government to become the largest 
 
 
 12. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 13. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1051. 
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investor in the U.S. automobile industry,14 a controlling owner of some 
of the largest lenders in the country, including Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae,15 and to inject hundreds of billions of dollars into the financial 
services sector through equity investments, loans and loan guarantees.16  
The government also has infused federal funds into the home mortgage 
refinance marketplace to forestall foreclosures.17
From its origins, antitrust law has been concerned with preventing 
the accumulation and exercise of economic power in big enterprises, 
rather than the vulnerability of the public to potential widespread 
economic disruption from the inherent vulnerability of big enterprises.
  At least some of this 
government intervention was at least arguably a consequence of these 
sectors of the economy being “dominated by a few corporate giants.”  
Moreover, government intrusion into the private sector in response to 
the too-big-to-fail issue appears to be nowhere near an end.  Additional 
government intervention of a more durable sort seems inevitable as 
Congress considers enacting new laws to try to forestall in the future 
what existing regulatory law did not.  Federal and state regulation has 
been enacted or is under consideration addressing dozens of areas of 
economic activity including real estate mortgage lending practices, 
trading in derivatives and other securities, solvency of financial 
institutions, management compensation, corporate governance, and even 
the permissible maximum size and investment activity of banks. 
18
 
 14. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 
AND AUTOMAKERS’ RESTRUCTURING TO DATE  1  (2009). 
  
It has never concerned itself with firms being too big to fail.  Indeed, the 
events that began in the second half of 2007 have led to a good deal of 
reflection about the extent to which antitrust law has weakened in recent 
decades and whether its focus has become too narrow.  However, as 
various alternative regulatory strategies are considered to address the 
problem, antitrust law has emerged as having at least some potential to 
promote a healthier economy that relies less on the economic stability of 
a small number of very large firms.  There is renewed interest in 
 15. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONTAINING FINANCIAL CRISIS 16-
20 (2008). 
 16. EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL MARKET 
INTERVENTION FAQ 2-4 (2008). 
 17. See, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 18. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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reinvigorating antitrust law to address the too-big-to-fail problem by 
invoking its original underlying policy concerns. 
Federal Trade Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch has advanced the 
view that a merger with the potential for catastrophic effects on a market 
as a whole can be challenged under the Clayton Act or the Federal Trade 
Commission Act for its tendency to destroy competition and harm 
consumers.  He has also opined that amendments to antitrust laws are 
not needed to bring these Acts to bear in preventing undesirable growth 
of enterprises.19  That view, though admittedly controversial, is an 
important one because it suggests the possibility of expanding existing 
analytical approaches, rather than necessarily amending the antitrust 
laws or turning exclusively to regulatory law instead.  Assistant 
Attorney General for antitrust Christine Varney has also suggested that 
the relaxation of antitrust enforcement played a role in creating 
conditions that led to the economic collapse in 2008, which similarly 
suggests that enforcement of existing law could contribute to broader 
efforts to prevent catastrophic business collapses.20
While these official views may be correct, antitrust law might 
surely play an even more important role if it were reinvigorated.  
Although there is no precedent for applying antitrust sanctions to block 
corporate expansion for the reason that a company might catastroph-
ically fail to the detriment of the nation’s economy as a whole, there is 
no reason in principle why antitrust law could not respond to the 
emergence of such growth in the future.  Of course, it may be that some 
too-big-to-fail companies got there without any possibility of antitrust 
intervention, at least not as antitrust is currently understood.  Indeed, if 
 
 
 19. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the New York 
Bar Association Annual Dinner: Implications of the Financial Meltdown for the FTC 
(Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter, Rosch] (“The Clayton Act is inherently prospective and the 
current standard prevents anticompetitive harm in its incipiency. Hence, if a merger 
creates a firm whose failure is likely to have a catastrophic effect on the market as a 
whole, because it is so integral to the market, the end result may be a substantial 
lessening of competition.”). 
 20. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
as Prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust 
Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm (“This country’s prior experience 
raises the question of whether current economic challenges reflect a ‘failure of 
antitrust.’ In other words, could United States antitrust authorities have done more? As 
many observers agree, in past years, with the exception of cartel enforcement, the 
pendulum swung too far from Thurman Arnold’s legacy of vigorous enforcement.”). 
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one considers the recent failures of companies like AIG and Citigroup, 
which grew via conglomerate rather than horizontal accretion, even a 
clairvoyant prediction of the catastrophe that these companies 
precipitated would not have drawn antitrust intervention under the 
existing approach.  However, other accumulations of corporate size, 
such as the mergers of financial institutions that were already too-big-to-
fail, might be an appropriate target for antitrust law.  Thus, the potential 
that antitrust law could prevent some ultimately catastrophic 
combinations or even force break-ups of companies that become too big 
merits at least some consideration. 
This article argues that modern antitrust law can contribute more 
than it has to reigning in the causes of long-run systemic instability 
represented by the too-big-to-fail problem.  Post-Chicago antitrust law 
narrowly focuses on allocative efficiency, which is rarely directly 
threatened by the sorts of risky conduct that give rise to systemic 
failures.  However, antitrust law and policy have shown impressive 
adaptability and dynamism over the 120 years since the enactment of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.21
This article explores the potential application of such a revived 
antitrust law to the problem of the too-big-to-fail enterprise.  It argues 
that a combination of reinvigorated existing law in conjunction with new 
antitrust legislation, could contribute significantly to the public policy 
arsenal of weapons for confronting this problem without offending the 
fundamental objectives of antitrust law.  Part II of this article defines the 
problem of “too-big-to fail” and identifies some of its essential 
characteristics.  Part III examines the limited reach of modern U.S. 
antitrust law, particularly how it largely fails to address the essential 
characteristics of too-big-to-fail firms.  Part IV then explores whether 
new or revived antitrust rules might provide some traction in addressing 
the policy problem presented by threats of catastrophic market failures.  
Part V concludes by advocating a modest proposal for reform. 
 
  Indeed, despite the evolution of 
antitrust law in recent decades, the broad array of policies that 
represented the foundations of antitrust for roughly a century have begun 
to rekindle interest among scholars and policymakers – and antitrust law 
reinvigorated by a revival of the original broader policy underpinnings 
that predated the law and economics movement might have at least a 
less modest role to play. 
 
 21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004). 
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: SOME ELEMENTS OF  
THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PROBLEM 
A. THE PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA – DAMNED EITHER WAY 
Applying antitrust concepts to the too-big-to-fail problem would 
seek to prevent or soften a public policy dilemma that has recently 
forced difficult choices on the nation.  The prospect of protecting a 
company against failure presents a deeply troublesome public policy 
dilemma.  If a firm’s failure will cause a wave of failures in a large 
enough segment of the economy as a whole, one policy option is to 
provide public infusions of capital to stave off unacceptable outcomes 
that would follow the failure, such as widespread economic disruption.  
The bailout policy choice, however, carries with it another unacceptable 
outcome in addition to the taxpayer burden: moral hazard.  Public rescue 
distorts future rational economic calculations of decision makers 
throughout the economy.  Economic actors can be expected to take 
greater risks if they believe that they will be protected against adverse 
consequences.  Furthermore, the bailout prospect for only the largest 
firms creates a potentially undesirable incentive for firms to grow in 
order to attain that protection.  If a firm can become “too big to fail,” it 
can more freely run risks with the expectation that the attendant risks 
will shift to the treasury rather than shareholders and managers.  The 
risk-assessment incentive structure created by the likelihood of bailouts 
thus encourages firms to position themselves precariously and to take 
risks that would otherwise be irrational.22
Another public policy dilemma created by a threatened systemic 
failure is presented when a government with finite resources must 
choose which among competing failures to cure via bailout funding.  In 
the recent crisis, the federal government elected to preserve one 
investment bank, but not another.  In March, 2008, Bear Stearns advised 
federal regulatory agencies that its liquidity position was so depleted that 
it would need to file for bankruptcy the next day absent an infusion of 
capital.
  Therefore, a bailout may 
solve one failure by inviting others later on. 
23
 
 22. See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF 
BANK BAILOUTS 11 (2004). 
  Within days, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
 23. Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear 
2011] THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES 271 
TO THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PHENOMENON 
 
Department moved to fund approximately $30 billion to JPMorgan 
Chase to allow the commercial bank to acquire the failing investment 
bank.24  Six months later, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was 
confronted with the failure of another investment bank, Lehman 
Brothers.25  Although the Fed again considered a bridge solution via 
Bank of America and Barclays, and those banks declined, ultimately the 
Federal Reserve participated in a decision about how far it would go to 
preserve both investment banks.26
Normally the market sorts out which companies survive and which 
fail, and that is as it should be . . . To prevent a disorderly failure of 
Bear Stearns and the unpredictable but likely severe consequences 
for the market functioning and broader economy, the Federal 
Reserve, in close consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed 
to provide funding to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase.
  Lehman Brothers is gone, Bear 
Stearns was saved.  Regulators themselves concede that they should not 
be making this sort of choice: 
27
The different contexts in which the two decisions were made may 
very well explain and even justify the Fed’s different approaches to Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers.  A decision in November 2008 to salvage 
Lehman Brothers would have been made by a Fed that was already 
buried in political fallout from its earlier rescue of Bear Stearns and in 
an economic environment that was going to require considerably more 
Fed assistance than was politically realistic.  Something had to give way, 
and it turned out to be an investment bank.  The demise of Lehman 
Brothers seems to have been forced by the many too-big-to-fail crises 
looming over the Fed as it made its decision. 
 
Therefore, the too-big-too-fail dilemma is twofold.  First, the 
prospect of such a failure forces the government to choose between 
unacceptable immediate economic risks and long-term moral hazard.  
 
Stearns, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2008, at A1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Damian Paletta et al., Lehman Fate Spurs Emergency Session --- Wall Street 
Titans Seek Ways to Stem Widening Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2008, at A1. 
 26. Jon Hilsenrath et al., Crisis Mode: Paulson, Bernanke Strained for Consensus 
in Bailout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A1. 
 27. Developments in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080403a.htm. 
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Second, it can involve the government in making decisions that are 
generally left to marketplace dynamics and outside the normal provinces 
of regulatory intervention, which runs contrary to the fundamental 
structure of a capitalist economic system. 
B. BIGNESS 
Before turning to the antitrust law issues, it is worth pausing to 
examine the phenomenon of systemic failure and the characteristics of 
firms that create the threat.  “Too-big-to-fail” is shorthand and widely 
agreed to be a misnomer because “bigness” alone is not the problem.  
Very big firms in a number of industries have failed without provoking 
serious discussion of public bailout to avoid broader economic systemic 
failures. 
For example, Enron failed in late 2001, at a time when it employed 
approximately 22,000 people and claimed to have revenues exceeding 
$100 billion.28  Based on reported revenues, Enron ranked 7th on the 
Fortune 500 list in 2001.29  Its failure was not attended with any serious 
consideration of bailing it out, despite the enormous hardships that its 
demise visited upon tens of thousands of citizens.  Enron was big, but 
not “too big to fail,” and indeed the Chairman of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission reported to Congress a few months later that 
“Enron’s collapse has not caused significant damage to the nation’s 
energy trading or energy supplies.”30
Similarly, WorldCom was ranked the 42d largest company in 
America when it failed in 2001 with $39.2 billion in reported revenues 
and 85,000 employees.
 
31
 
 28. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL  STREET GREED 83 (2010). 
  WorldCom was not simply big, it was far 
flung, having acquired MCI in 1998 to become the second largest U.S. 
long-distance carrier, and also having acquired UNet, CompuServe, and 
America Online’s data network to become a leading internet 
 29. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENRON COLLAPSE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL ISSUES 1 (2002). 
 30. The Effect of the Bankruptcy of Enron on the Functioning of Energy Markets: 
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 107th Cong. 32 (2002) (statement of Hon. Patrick H. Woods III, 
Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). 
 31. BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WORLDCOM: THE 
ACCOUNTING SCANDAL 2, 4 (2002). 
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infrastructure operator.32  Its market capitalization dropped precipitously 
by nearly $150 billion by early July 2002 as a consequence of 
revelations about accounting irregularities and also due to the vast 
oversupply in the market for telecommunications capacity.33  On July 
21, 2002, WorldCom filed what was at the time the largest bankruptcy in 
the nation’s history.34
C. INTERRELATEDNESS WITH THE ECONOMIC ECOSYSTEM:  
UNUSUAL DEPENDENCIES 
  No public policy debate emerged over whether to 
bail WorldCom out of its difficulties despite the extensive hardships and 
economic disruption its failure prompted. 
The firm that is too-big-to-fail is really both big and integral to one 
or more industries of critical importance to the overall economy (or as 
one observer nicely put it, the “business ecosystem”).35  American 
Insurance Group, Inc. (“AIG”) provides an instructive example of a 
company that was determined to “be too big to fail” based not only on 
its size, but on other factors as well.  It certainly was very big.  AIG 
operated in four major business lines: (i) general property and casualty 
insurance, (ii) life insurance and retirement services, (iii) financial 
services, and (iv) asset management.  As of September 30, 2008, AIG 
reported consolidated total assets in excess of $1 trillion and 
stockholders’ equity of approximately $71 billion.  In 2007, AIG’s life 
and health insurance businesses ranked first in the United States 
measured by net premiums written ($51.3 billion) and third in terms of 
total assets at year-end ($364 billion).  For the same period, AIG’s 
property and casualty insurance businesses ranked second in the United 
States measured by net premiums written ($35.2 billion) and third based 
upon total assets at year-end ($124.5 billion).36
 
 32. Id. at 2. 
  It has been argued that 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1. 
 35. See Too Big To Fail? The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded 
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts and 
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congress 9 (2009) 
(statement of Albert A. Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute). 
 36. Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008: Restructuring of the Government’s Financial Support to the American 
International Group, Inc. (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/monetarypolicy/files/129aigrestructure.pdf. 
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the solution to the to-big-to-fail problem, at least in the financial services 
sector, should include limiting the size of firms like AIG so that any 
single firm’s failure would present less systemic risk.37
However, AIG’s size alone does not explain the perceived need for 
its rescue, which, instead, stemmed from its vast commitments 
throughout the global financial markets.  It was feared that a default on 
AIG’s commitments would have created a shock-wave effect across a 
broad swath of economic activity.  Those who were at risk from a failure 
of AIG included large investors, small investors in money market 
mutual funds (including retirement accounts), insurance policyholders 
and claimants, state and local governments that had extended credit to 
AIG, global commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial 
institutions, as well as subsidiaries of AIG itself.  AIG was a major 
participant in the derivatives markets, as well as a significant 
counterparty to a large number of major national and international 
financial institutions.  Out of credit swaps that had been sold by an AIG 
division having a notional value of $372 billion, approximately $250 
billion represented transactions designed to provide financial institutions 
with regulatory capital relief.
 
38
At best, the consequences of AIG’s failure would have been a 
significant intensification of an already severe financial crisis and a 
further worsening of global economic conditions.  Conceivably, its 
failure could have resulted in a 1930s-style global financial and 
  AIG’s failure would have impaired or 
even gutted the capital bases of many of the world’s largest financial 
institutions.  Federal Reserve Board Chairman Benjamin Bernanke 
concluded, along with the Treasury Department, that: 
 
 37. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Are Some Institutions Too Big To Fail And If So, What 
Should We Do About It?: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 60 
(2009) (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, MIT 
Sloan School of Management; Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics) (“[S]ome will complain about ‘efficiency costs’ from breaking up banks, 
and they may have a point. But you need to weigh any such costs against the benefits of 
no longer having banks that are too big to fail. Anything that is ‘too big to fail’ is now 
‘too big to exist.’”) (emphasis added). 
 38. AIG REPORT, supra note 3, at 2,3; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES 
AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT, at 
7,8 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/ 
129periodicupdate02252009.pdf. 
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economic meltdown, with catastrophic implications for production, 
income, and jobs.39
On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve and Treasury agreed 
to extend $85 billion in secured loans to AIG, an amount that 
subsequently increased to more than double that amount.
 
40
Interrelatedness is thus a characteristic of the too-big-to-fail firm, 
whose mutual interdependencies are substantial in scope and incapable 
of satisfactory resolution through bankruptcy.  The extent of these 
interdependencies seems important in distinguishing between firms that 
are too big to fail and firms whose failures result in harsh but acceptable 
consequences.  Many large companies maintain interdependent relation- 
ships with many others, but only some of these reach levels that can 
draw entire economic systems into potential collapse.  Enron, for 
example, was intricately interconnected and certainly was not in its own 
solitary orbit when it failed.  It was deeply interrelated in energy 
markets, and its failure caused serious problems in entirely unrelated 
markets, as well as in the natural gas market, where the prospect of 
Enron’s contracts going unhonored sent shock waves through that 
particular market.  More immediately, its demise cost over 28,000 
employees at Arthur Andersen’s U.S. operations their jobs and 1,750 
Andersen partners lost most of their entire life savings.
  The 
objective was not merely to protect AIG from the normal processes of 
bankruptcy, but to prevent a downward spiraling of the entire financial 
services sector in the United States and globally.  AIG’s elaborate, 
unregulated and risky commitments cast a dark shadow across a network 
of counterparties whose contractual interrelationships had created 
mutual dependencies on a vast scale. 
41
 
 39. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs. (March 24, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
testimony/bernanke20090324a.htm. 
  However, the 
extent of economic harm from Enron’s demise was contained without 
government bailouts, and no threat across the economy as a whole was 
perceived.  Thus, a firm that is too-big-to-fail is one whose 
interdependencies extend so far that failure of the firm spells broader 
 40. Aaron Smith & David Goldman, Fed Reduces AIG’s Debt By $25 Million, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 1, 2009, 9:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/01/ 
news/companies/aig/index.htm. 
 41. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen Layoff to Hit Support Staff Hardest, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2002, at C1. 
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failures that could harm the economy as a whole.  Enron’s failure might 
have brought about failures of a large number of natural gas traders, for 
example, but the emanations for those failures would not have been 
anything comparable to the global bank failures that would apparently 
have resulted from a failure to rescue AIG. 
C. SURROUNDING ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Defining a firm as too big to fail also requires consideration of 
context, particularly the economic conditions surrounding the potential 
failure.  By the time AIG stood at the edge of failure, the financial 
system, especially the credit markets, were already deeply troubled.  
AIG’s counterparties included a significant part of the world’s credit 
markets, and they in turn were very much at risk of collapse if AIG’s 
commitments to them turned out to be worthless.  Furthermore, AIG was 
not alone in its perilous condition, and many of its largest counterparties 
were weak or had already failed.  When the United States loaned AIG 
$85 billion on September 16, 2008, credit markets were already in 
turmoil from the government’s takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
ten days earlier, and from the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on 
September 15, 2008.42  Other major financial institutions were under 
stress, including, among others, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch.43
It was an extraordinary time.  Global financial markets were 
experiencing unprecedented strains and a worldwide loss of 
confidence.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been placed into 
conservatorship only two weeks earlier, and Lehman Brothers had 
filed for bankruptcy the day before.  We were very concerned about 
  The 
risks of allowing AIG to file for bankruptcy in this context were 
perceived as too great.  As Chairman Bernanke testified before 
Congress, the decision to invest in AIG was driven not just by AIG’s 
role in the broader economic ecosystem, but by the economic context in 
which the failure of AIG would have occurred absent government 
intervention: 
 
 42. Oversight of the Federal Government’s Intervention at American International 
Group: Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 111th Congress 10 (2009) (statement of 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System). 
 43. MURPHY, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
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a number of other major firms that were under intense stress.44
It follows from this testimony that the public policy makers who 
decided that the government needed to invest in AIG probably would 
not have taken that step in some other economic climates.  Had credit 
markets not already been strained, had Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Wachovia and 
many other financial behemoths not been imperiled at the same moment, 
there exists reason to doubt whether AIG failing all by itself would have 
threatened the economy as a whole as it did.  Thus, a company is not 
simply too-big-to-fail in the abstract, but poses broader risks in some 
contexts than others – some of these presenting unacceptable risks. 
 
 
III. POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST LAW  
AND THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PROBLEM 
The foregoing is not intended as an empirical study of the problem, 
which would certainly be a worthy, but different, undertaking.45
 
 44. Oversight, supra note 43, at 71 (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, 
Federal Reserve System). 
  Rather, 
identifying certain characteristics of firms whose failures presented 
unacceptable consequences focuses the consideration on the problems 
that antitrust would need to address to help mitigate or avoid the public 
policy dilemmas posed by these impending business failures.  It is with 
this in mind that the partial list above was fashioned.  Again, these 
 45. Nor is this analysis exhaustive.  For example, another characteristic of a firm 
that presents a too-big-to-fail problem might be the absence of certain types of 
culpability.  Public bailouts are unlikely to be considered in response to a failure 
brought about by criminal misconduct on the part of corporate management.  “Too-big-
to-fail” problems often result from risky conduct, and indeed the problem is essentially 
one of loss-shifting to the treasury and away from the corporate actors who took the 
risks.  When the risks that precipitate corporate collapse are substantially aggravated by 
illegal or fraudulent conduct, however, relief sought from the government meets with an 
additional layer of political resistance.  Enron and WorldCom failed as a direct 
consequence of conduct that was highly risky and which was unlawfully and 
deliberately concealed in violation of civil and criminal securities laws, among others.  
Fraud concealing their financial downturn allowed the risky conduct to persist until its 
cumulative effects brought about irreversible failures.  No serious consideration was 
given to public bailouts.  If criminality brings on a business collapse with devastating 
collateral damage to the economy or investors, however, the resulting problem is more 
directly addressed by means other than antitrust law. 
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characteristics include: (1) size; (2) interrelatedness in the economic 
ecosystem; and (3) surrounding economic context or events.  Having 
identified some common elements of the too-big-to-fail problem, it 
begins to emerge why United States antitrust law as it is currently 
understood and enforced might have, at most, very limited application to 
help avert or solve future too-big-to-fail problems. 
A. THE NARROW MODERN FOCUS OF U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY 
The current state of antitrust law is often referred to as embracing 
“Post-Chicago School” economic theory.  Post-Chicago School antitrust 
is the stepchild of Chicago School antitrust, which represented a radical 
departure from historic antitrust policy.  As discussed later in this article, 
antitrust policy (and thus antitrust law itself) has had a dynamic history, 
changing rather dramatically in response to intellectual developments in 
the field of economics and to changes in the economy itself.  Early 
antitrust decisions embraced a sweeping array of economic, political and 
social policies.46  A turn toward a less value-laden antitrust law began to 
take shape in the 1970s, promoted by intellectual descendants of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.47  Lawyers for corporate interests and industrial 
organization economists of the Chicago School mounted an organized 
effort that succeeded in persuading the federal courts to adopt a far 
narrower view of antitrust that has as its single objective the avoidance 
of economically inefficient transactions, referred to by economists as 
“allocative efficiency.”48  In the last two decades of the Twentieth 
Century, antitrust law embraced this narrow, Chicago School, doctrinal 
approach to antitrust law and accepted the optimization of allocative 
efficiency of firms and markets as the dominant antitrust policy.49
 
 46. See infra Part 3.b. 
  This 
 47. For an interesting historical treatment of the legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF 
JUSTICE HOLMES (2000). 
 48. See, Pitofsky, supra  note 2, at 1051; Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and 
Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 
349 (1982); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: 
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977). 
 49. Allocative or economic efficiency of markets refers to the situation in which it 
is impossible to generate a larger total societal welfare from the available resources 
without technological advancement.  Allocative efficiency differs from distributive 
values or fairness.  Chicago School proponents argue that economics should concern 
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objective was advocated in some influential quarters as the exclusive 
policy of the Sherman Act.  For example, a leading proponent of the 
Chicago School argued that the “whole task of antitrust can be summed 
up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing 
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss 
in consumer welfare.”50  In the earliest phase of this revision and 
reconstruction of antitrust law, Chicago School adherents persuaded 
courts not only to restrict antitrust to the enforcement of efficient 
markets, but, more radically, also persuaded them that markets whose 
allocative efficiency is distorted by monopolistic or conspiratorial 
misconduct tend to self-correct without great cost to society and, thus, 
take greater benefit from judicial restraint than from costly and error-
prone judicial intervention.51
The Chicago School came to dominate judicial and federal agency 
interpretations of the law, and played a central role in a string of 
 
 
itself only with aggregate welfare rather than distributive welfare – i.e., how much 
society produces at what cost, but not who gets it. The founder of the Chicago School 
articulated its value-barren approach: 
Why do economists object to monopoly? The purely ‘economic’ argument against 
monopoly is very different from what noneconomists might expect. Successful 
monopolists charge prices above what they would be with competition so that 
customers pay more and the monopolists (and perhaps their employees) gain. It 
may seem strange, but economists see no reason to criticize monopolies simply 
because they transfer wealth from customers to monopoly producers. That is 
because economists have no way of knowing who is the more worthy of the two 
parties—the producer or the customer. Of course, people (including economists) 
may object to the wealth transfer on other grounds, including moral ones. But the 
transfer itself does not present an ‘economic’ problem.  Rather, the purely 
‘economic’ case against monopoly is that it reduces aggregate economic welfare 
(as opposed to simply making some people worse off and others better off by an 
equal amount). When the monopolist raises prices above the competitive level in 
order to reap his monopoly profits, customers buy less of the product, less is 
produced, and society as a whole is worse off. In short, monopoly reduces 
society’s income. 
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 
(1982).   By defining economics as “value neutral,” and then pressing for purely 
economics-driven antitrust law interpretations, the Chicago School sought to strip 
antitrust of any role as referee over the fairness of markets or the distributive fairness of 
the economy as a whole. 
 50. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 
(1993). 
 51. See Bell Atl. Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567-68 (2007); Credit Suisse 
Sec., LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2003). 
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Supreme Court decisions overturning more liberal, time-worn, 
precedents.52  The elevation of allocative efficiency as the central goal of 
antitrust became widely accepted, so much so that courts and 
commentators often seem to believe that this had always been antitrust’s 
exclusive concern.53
 
 52. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120-21 (2009) 
(overturning the price squeeze prohibition in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), based on “developments in economic theory and antitrust 
jurisprudence since Alcoa”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 882 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373 (1911)); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald 
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) (overruling Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 
(1967)); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 n.12 (1977) 
(overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). 
  Allocative efficiency is equated with consumer 
welfare in the sense that consumers are best off in a market that achieves 
optimum allocative efficiency – prices in such markets send accurate 
signals to producers and innovators to yield optimum outcomes for 
consumers.  While the most extreme position, that no other policies 
aside from consumer welfare have any relevance, was not adopted by 
the courts, economic efficiency came to predominate to a large extent 
and effectively displaced other policy objectives that at one time or 
another were considered important considerations in the application of 
antitrust law.  During this Chicago School phase, antitrust enforcement 
at the federal level was largely confined to unambiguous cartel activity 
and blatantly problematic mergers, leaving more subtle misconduct to 
marketplace self-corrections that the Chicago School doctrine 
anticipated would always or nearly always solve problems better than 
 53. As a senior economist at the United States Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division put it succinctly: “efficiency is the goal, competition is the process.”  Kenneth 
Heyer, Address before the Merger Task Force of the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Competition (Apr. 9, 2002); see also Lawrence Summers, 
Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001), (“[I]t 
needs to be remembered that the goal is efficiency, not competition.  The ultimate goal 
is that there be efficiency.”).  The efficiency-oriented policy of competition law has also 
gained favor in international circles largely at the insistence of United States policy 
makers and scholars.  For example, a 1996 report of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development affirmed that “the basic objective of competition policy 
is to protect competition as the most appropriate means of ensuring the efficient 
allocation of resources -- and thus efficient market outcomes -- in free market 
economies.” OECD, Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in Horizontal 
Agreements, at 5, OECD/GD Doc. (96)65 (1996). 
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antitrust courts.54
Critics of the Chicago School found a number of flaws in the 
theory, and also cautioned against elevating theory over facts in deciding 
antitrust issues.  Markets do not tend to follow theory neatly, and market 
imperfections can confound the application of theory to the complex 
factual settings that typically are encountered in antitrust matters.
 
55  A 
new, more moderate “Post-Chicago School” approach thus emerged in 
the early 1990s,56 and eventually succeeded in establishing a somewhat 
more tempered approach.  Post-Chicago antitrust theory continues to 
adhere to the limited objective of economic efficiency, but relies with 
less assurance on market forces to correct interferences with market 
competition.57  Although somewhat tempered as measured against the 
early Chicago School, “Post-Chicago” antitrust theory departs from the 
Chicago School views mostly around the margins.  Post-Chicago 
antitrust theory does not regard market concentration as an ill, let alone 
an evil, in the absence of entry barriers;58 it scrupulously distinguishes 
abuse of monopoly power from vigorous successful competition by 
dominant firms;59 it broadly tolerates vertical price and non-price 
restraints;60
 
 54. See Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925, 928 (1979). 
 it regards predatory pricing as an unlikely source of 
 55. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473 
(1992). 
 56. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-49 (1986). 
 57. J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the 
International Bar Association Antitrust Section Conference: I Say Monopoly, You Say 
Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, Is It the 
Economics? (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/ 
070908isaymonopolyiba.pdf. 
 58. See e.g., JOHN S. MCGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971). 
 59. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 
2 ‘can be difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate 
competition, are myriad.’”) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 
 60. See e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 
(2007) (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for other 
vertical restraints.  Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate interbrand 
competition -- the competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the 
same type of product -- by reducing intrabrand competition -- the competition among 
retailers selling the same brand.  The promotion of interbrand competition is important 
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consumer harm.61
Although “Post-Chicago” confidence in the self-correcting 
tendencies of markets has dampened, it remains a persistent theme.  
Recently, Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 treatise Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, which predicted the self-destruction of capitalism, has 
enjoyed a surprising and influential revival, at least as to its 
metaphorical description of the “gales of creative destruction.”
  Under this theory, antitrust has retained as its primary 
targets the more virulent forms of cartel activity and certain obviously 
problematic merger activity. 
62  
According to Schumpeter and his modern adherents, market participants 
are understood to be, in many cases, competing for the market, rather 
than within it, and competition on the basis of price is a poor heuristic to 
explain how markets actually function.63  Citing Schumpeter for a 
position that is broadly tolerant of monopoly power as a lure toward 
innovation, the (now former) Assistant Attorney General for antitrust 
remarked in 2006 that “[t]he existence of firms with large market shares 
does not necessarily or even typically reflect competitive harm—to the 
contrary, firms typically obtain large market shares by offering products 
that consumers prefer over other firms’ offerings.”64
Thus, Post-Chicago antitrust theory remained skeptical of antitrust 
intervention, but marginally less so than its more radical precedent in the 
Chicago school.  However, current antitrust law has been blunted by 
concerns about so-called “Type One error” or over-enforcement of 
 
 
because ‘the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] 
competition.’” (citations omitted). 
 61. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 
(1993).  “As we have said in the Sherman Act context, ‘predatory pricing schemes are 
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,’ and the costs of an erroneous finding of 
liability are high. ‘[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing -- 
lowering prices -- is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; 
because ‘cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of 
competition . . . [;] mistaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because they chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” (citations omitted). 
 62. See e.g., Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Opening Remarks before the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission: The 
Gales of Creative Destruction: The Need for Clear and Objective Standards for 
Enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act (June 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216738.htm. 
 63. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-85 
(1975). 
 64. Id. at 6. 
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antitrust rules. 
B. INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST AS A PUBLIC 
POLICY TOOL TO ADDRESS TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL PROBLEMS 
A preliminary consideration is thus whether current Post-Chicago 
economics and antitrust policy could conceivably be applied to prevent 
or unwind the existence of a too-big-to-fail firm, or to prevent its actual 
or impending failure.  On its face, this seems a doubtful proposition.  
The central purpose of modern antitrust law is the protection of 
consumer welfare, specifically price, output and innovation.65  It has 
been suggested that the actual or even potential collapse of a too-big-to-
fail firm implicates consumer welfare,66 and does so in a manner that 
existing antitrust law principles might address by application of Section 
7 of the Clayton Act67 to the mergers and other business combinations 
that create these behemoths, or perhaps by application of Sections 1 or 2 
of the Sherman Act.68
For example, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) has speculated that “mergers should arguably be 
examined with an eye toward whether they are creating a merged entity 
that is ‘too big to fail.’ If so, the transaction may violate Section 7 (or 
Section 1).”
 
69  Commissioner Rosch’s point was not the trivial one that 
some mergers that create very big combinations may violate the 
standards set forth in existing law or policy statements by exceeding 
tolerable concentration levels.70
 
 65. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 221 (noting the antitrust laws’ “traditional 
concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 
(1979))). 
  Instead, Commissioner Rosch 
articulated the view that it is at least possible, without amending the law, 
to interpret existing antirust law to protect against some instances of the 
sorts of business collapse that result in traditional forms of consumer 
 66. See Rosch, supra note 20. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. 
 69. See Rosch, supra note 20. 
 70. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html 
[hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
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harm, such as reduced output, when an entire industry is hobbled. 
Furthermore, since antitrust laws addressing mergers are 
prophylactic, the argument extends not only to cleaning up a too-big-to-
fail problem, which comes too late to protect consumers, but, more 
ambitiously, to prevent the problem before it bubbles up. Since the 
failure of a too-big-to-fail firm would unavoidably reduce economic 
activity, and thus output, for a protracted period of time and might also 
eliminate or restrict investments in R&D (so goes the argument),71
The argument is appealing, but has apparent limitations.  First, not 
all consumer harm in the form of higher prices, reduced output or 
diminished innovation implicates antitrust policy because these harms 
sometimes are brought about by mechanisms that antitrust is not 
concerned with.  Consumers have certainly suffered a variety of 
hardships from the financial meltdown, including evictions from their 
homes,
 
antitrust policy should address itself to this general area of public 
concern.  That is, if the failure of a too-big-to-fail firm could bring about 
the sorts of consumer harm that the antitrust laws protect against, then 
antitrust law might be implicated by the emergence of such firms in the 
first place, before they fail. 
72 loss of jobs,73 disappearing retirement savings,74 higher prices 
for certain types of credit,75 and generally diminished output throughout 
the economy.76
 
 71. Rosch, supra note 20. 
  These harms were, to a large degree, precipitated by the 
mismanagement of too-big-to-fail banks and other financial institutions.  
However, are these antitrust harms? Not obviously, anyway, and 
antitrust law deliberately has been limited to avoid extending antitrust 
remedies to every sort of conduct that may harm consumers – they must 
be harmed in particular ways that are quite narrow.  For example, 
consumers also suffered economic harms when the attacks on September 
11, 2001 led to (among other more horrible consequences) the 
 72. John Leland, As Owners Feel Mortgage Pain, So Do Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
18, 2007, at A1. 
 73. JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT: ISSUES 
IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011). 
 74. Kelly Evans, U.S. News: Ranks of Older Workers Swell as Losses Shorten 
Retirement, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, at A2. 
 75. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE SMALL 
BUSINESS CREDIT CRUNCH AND THE IMPACT OF THE TARP 15-17 (2009), available at  
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-051310-report.pdf. 
 76. GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 74, at 3. 
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immediate grounding of all air traffic within the United States, thus 
reducing output in the air transportation markets77 – but no one could 
argue that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed violated the antitrust laws by 
restraining trade in those markets.  The mechanism by which output was 
affected by terrorist attacks was different from the sort of activity that 
antitrust is intended to prevent.78
Antitrust law seeks to prevent antitrust injury, and courts have 
narrowly construed the “antitrust injury” element of an antitrust case to 
mean injury flowing from conduct that violates antitrust rules of 
conduct, which prohibit, for example, price fixing.
 
79
An additional limitation of Post-Chicago antitrust is its 
preoccupation with so-called Type One errors, or over-deterrence.  For 
example, in Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
the Supreme Court was centrally motivated by its desire to avoid 
  On this basis, 
courts have limited antitrust remedies to redress only certain types of 
reasonably well-understood categories of marketplace misconduct, so 
that flying an airplane into the World Trade Center does not count 
regardless of its intended and actual consequences for the economy.  
Thus, one challenge with addressing antitrust law to the too-big-to-fail 
problem is to connect the requisite sorts of consumer harm with the sorts 
of anticompetitive mechanisms that antitrust law cares about.  Being big 
or about to fail are not obviously among these anticompetitive 
mechanisms since antitrust is not a status offense.  Beyond that, even 
being very big and taking what turn out to be poorly considered risks are 
not obviously antitrust offenses either because that is not the sort of 
conduct antitrust seeks to prevent – at least not under Post-Chicago 
antitrust.  Thus, as a starting point, antitrust intervention to prevent too-
big-to-fail problems could not prevent the collapse of a firm that would 
not cause any sort of antitrust injury to consumers or that caused such 
harm via the wrong mechanisms. 
 
 77. Ryan Tam & R. John Hansman, Impact of Air Transportation on Regional 
Economic and Social Connectivity in the United States 1 (American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2002), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1721.1/35884/atio_tamhansman.pdf?sequence=1. 
 78. See generally, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977) (“Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful.  The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of 
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”). 
 79. See FTC v. Sup. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
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punishing price cutting behavior that might be predatory, coupled with 
any perceivable risk of simultaneously discouraging price cutting that is 
competitive, when it redefined, and all but eliminated, the offense of 
predatory pricing.  It found that “[a]s a general rule, the exclusionary 
effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower 
cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on 
the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to 
control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price 
cutting.”80
Such preoccupation with Type One errors also reaches other 
antitrust cases beyond the predatory pricing context.  The case that 
extended the Brooke rule to predatory bidding evoked an amicus brief 
from the Antitrust Division that, along with several of its other amicus 
briefs, evidenced the same preoccupation with the “false positive” 
problem and over-deterrence.
 
81  In that case, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the Justice Department, again reciting “intolerable risks of chilling 
legitimate procompetitive conduct.”82  Most recently, the Court 
introduced a new rule to bar most “price squeeze” claims, again citing 
this same “intolerable risk” of false positives, and again supported by the 
Antitrust Division’s refrain that “the risk of imposing liability in cases 
involving procompetitive price-cutting, and ‘the costs of [such] an 
erroneous finding of liability are high,’. . . because such errors (or ‘false 
positives’) would ‘chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.’”83  In another decision that recites this same policy basis, the 
Court all but eviscerated the essential facilities doctrine along with the 
Second Circuit’s “monopoly leveraging” rule.  It reasoned that 
“[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are 
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws 
are designed to protect.’”84
 
 80. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993). 
  Here too, the Antitrust Division, along with 
 81. “[A] broader rule could lead to ‘false positives’ and thereby ‘chill the very 
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’”  Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, Weyerhaueser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 
312 (2007) (No. 85-381). 
 82. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 
325 (2007). 
 83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Pac. 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (No. 07-512). 
 84. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
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the Federal Trade Commission, encouraged the result, urging that the 
doctrine “encourages litigants to seek antitrust remedies for ordinary 
commercial and regulatory disputes” – in other words, the doctrine chills 
competitive conduct.85
 When one considers the conduct that Post-Chicago antitrust 
prohibits against the backdrop of the characteristics of a too-big-to-fail 
firm, it becomes apparent that current antitrust principles have very 
limited application to the problem.  This is not to say there is no room 
for productive antitrust intervention, but, realistically, there is very little. 
  From this policy perspective, a number of 
antitrust rules have been relaxed or even eliminated. 
C. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION OF  
EXISTING ANTITRUST RULES TO THE TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL FIRM 
Among the attributes of a too-big-to-fail company identified above, 
the “bigness” attribute seems the most obvious subject for antitrust 
policy.  There are three main impediments in the way of applying 
modern antitrust law to prevent bigness of the too-big-to-fail sort.  First, 
allocative efficiency tends to favor or, at most, be neutral to bigness.  
Since the vast scale of the too-big-to-fail enterprise is an essential 
ingredient of the problem, antitrust’s modern ambivalence or outright 
resistance to controlling bigness poses one problem.  A second problem 
is that of the self-inflicted wound: antitrust opposes monopolistic 
misconduct, mergers or collusion, but it does not oppose the self-
destruction of a dominant firm, even where the same sort of consumer 
harm or allocative inefficiency results.  Third, prophylactic antitrust 
rules are timid about speculating, and the too-big-to-fail problem is 
layered in just the sort of contingencies that antitrust precedents resist to 
predict.  If antitrust is to have a meaningful role in containing the 
problem of catastrophic business failures, it will need to overcome these 
three problems. 
   1. The Bigness Problem 
The approach that antitrust law currently takes toward bigness 
 
398, 414 (2004). 
 85. Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
(No. 02-682). 
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creates the first of these limitations.  Antitrust as currently understood 
has no particular antipathy towards large-scale enterprise.  In fact, on 
balance, antitrust tends to encourage large-scale enterprise.  It 
recognizes that the potential economies of scale attainable by large 
enterprises may create increased efficiencies, which can benefit 
consumers.86  Thus, where economies of scale may be involved, modern 
antitrust law exercises caution before condemning large enterprises.87
For example, economies of scale may (like other efficiencies) 
constitute a defense to a merger challenge.
 
88  In evaluating a hospital 
merger under the Clayton Act,89 an appellate court noted that the 
“evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more efficient . . . will 
provide better medical care than either of [the merging] hospitals could 
separately. The merged entity will be able to attract more highly 
qualified physicians and specialists and to offer integrated delivery and 
some tertiary care . . .  The evidence shows that the merged entity may 
well enhance competition.”90  Of course, it was of no consequence in 
that case that the merged firm’s ability to attract the best doctors might 
adversely affect other hospitals, or that its size might make the firm 
indispensible to the community so that its failure could never be 
tolerated.  In the context of a single firm with monopoly power, antitrust 
law does not inhibit its taking advantage of economies of scale even 
where smaller rivals are disadvantaged as a result.91
 
 86. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 287 (1985) (“The cooperative arrangement thus permits the 
participating retailers to achieve economies of scale in purchasing and warehousing that 
would otherwise be unavailable to them.”). 
 
 87. Id. (collusion and joint ventures); see also, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71; 
FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (scale economies 
recognized as a cognizable efficiency in antitrust merger analysis). 
 88. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71; United States v. Long Island Jewish 
Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 89. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain mergers and acquisitions whose 
effects may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce. 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18 (2010). 
 90. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 91. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); 
see also, Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In 
determining whether conduct may be characterized as exclusionary, it is relevant to 
consider its impact on consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an 
unnecessarily restrictive way.  If a firm has been attempting to exclude rivals on some 
basis other than efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory [or 
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A merger is not the only setting in which antitrust champions scale 
efficiencies.  At the retail level, economies of scale constitute a 
legitimate reason for a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition by 
imposing vertical restraints.92  Antitrust law also generally tolerates 
combinations of competitors into joint ventures to achieve economies of 
scale, with the presence of such efficiencies removing a challenge from 
the application of per se condemnation and establishing a facially 
plausible justification for the concerted activity.93  Removing conduct 
from per se illegality comes close to legalizing it, given the rarity of 
plaintiff successes in challenging the conduct under the rule of reason.94
Thus, modern antitrust law tends to encourage, rather than 
discourage, bigness.  In fact, its focus on allocative efficiency renders 
this consequence unsurprising.  A firm achieving scale economies 
produces greater output at lower cost.  That other competitors might be 
devastated in the process is not a modern antitrust concern.  Nor is it of 
any concern that scale efficiency may result in indispensability to the 
marketplace. 
 
Only in the most indirect way does modern antitrust law discourage 
bigness by imposing somewhat more stringent standards on firms that 
have market power (which sometimes equates to bigness, although not 
always) or that operate in oligopoly markets (in which the small number 
of rivals sometimes means that they are large, but not always).  The 
 
exclusionary.]  However, merely because an entity has monopoly power, does not bar it 
from taking advantage of its scale of economies because of its size. Such advantages are 
a consequence of size and not the exercise of monopoly power.”) (citations omitted). 
 92. “A purpose to facilitate point-of-sale services or to protect minimum economies 
of scale could induce a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition.  Notwithstanding 
price effects, such limitations are lawful when reasonable and not subject to automatic 
condemnation.”  Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 746 
(1988) (quoting 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1457, 174-75 (1986)). 
 93. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 
472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985). 
 94. One rare successful challenge under the rule of reason is found in Polygram 
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a case that is indicative of the 
difficulties plaintiffs face under Post-Chicago School antitrust rules.  In that case the 
FTC challenged an agreement between competing record companies to suspend 
advertising and discounting of two record albums temporarily during the launch period 
for a jointly-produced recording.  The court affirmed the FTC’s application of the rule 
of reason to the challenged agreement, even though it involved competitors agreeing not 
to put specific products on sale for a period of time – a collusive restriction on price and 
advertising that in an earlier era probably would have met with per se condemnation. 
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existence of monopoly power is not unlawful by itself, but Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act imposes different, more stringent, standards of conduct 
on firms that have (or threaten to achieve) market power.95  Moreover, 
antitrust law imposes a different set of rules on the conduct of large 
monopolies.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act sometimes imposes more 
stringent standards on firms in highly concentrated markets, or at least 
exposes them to antitrust risks that probably inhibit a certain amount of 
marketplace conduct than would otherwise occur.96  Firms operating in a 
market with an oligopolistic structure are subject to certain limitations 
on their behavior, and may more easily be found to have engaged in 
unlawful price fixing or tacit collusion than firms in more diffuse 
markets.  For instance, “a showing of parallel business behavior is 
admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer 
agreement” in a Sherman Act conspiracy case.97  While such parallel 
conduct alone is not enough to support a conspiracy complaint,98 the 
potential exposure to antitrust remedies can discourage firms in an 
oligopolistic market from acting as freely as they might in a more 
competitive one.  This holds particularly true if firms interact through 
trade associations or in other contexts that would add to the inference of 
agreement.99
However, it is one thing to demand higher standards of conduct in 
monopolistic and concentrated markets, and quite another to discourage 
the existence of big firms.  First, size and market power are not the same 
thing, such that many big firms do not have market power that would 
even implicate the constraints of heightened antitrust scrutiny.  These 
constraints apply to some big firms, but not all, and can also apply to 
small firms.  Indeed, monopolies can be large, but they can also be small 
by any measure, such as a monopoly held by virtue of a patent over a 
small but essential input, or in a market that can sustain only a single 
  Thus, antitrust law imposes certain burdens on 
monopolists and oligopolists, and, to this limited extent, can be seen as 
disfavoring these market structures. 
 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). 
 97. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See e.g., Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a range of circumstantial evidence can show 
collusion; “[f]or example, have they attended meetings or conducted discussions at 
which they had the opportunity to conspire…?”). 
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small seller, such as the local baker in a village without any others.100
More importantly, the possibility of encountering more stringent 
antitrust conduct rules would not plausibly lead firms to control their 
own size.  The economic inducements for growth and market power are 
compelling, and, in some cases, vast size can be obtained without even 
implicating antitrust rules, such as by conglomerate or out-of-market 
acquisition activity.  It seems unlikely that a firm would decide, for 
example, to forego an opportunity to increase its size and market share 
on the thin ground that doing so would require it to exercise more 
caution when attending trade association meetings. 
 
Market extension combinations that do not even implicate antitrust 
rules have fueled growth in key sectors of the economy. The banking 
industry, one that is central to the too-big-to-fail crisis, provides an 
excellent example.  The banking industry transformed itself from 
relatively small and local enterprises to global giants through merger 
activity and relaxed regulation.  Between 1980 and 1999, the number of 
commercial banks declined from approximately 15,000 to just 9,000.  
The trend toward concentration continued into the new century.  At the 
end of 2000, there were 397 banks with assets of $1 billion or more; by 
mid-2009 there were 136 more of these large banks, and at the same 
time, the total number of commercial banks dropped by approximately 
1,320.101  The concentration of the banking industry provoked almost no 
antitrust intervention.  Bank mergers implicate antitrust laws only when 
they combine competing banks with overlapping geographic reach.102
 
 100. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). 
  
The biggest bank mergers often involved little in the way of competitive 
 101. Statistics on Banking, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/. 
 102. For example, the proposed merger of PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. with 
National City Corporation was approved by the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice on the condition that the parties divest a total of 61 branches in 
western Pennsylvania with approximately $4.1 billion in deposits, as well as certain 
middle-market lending operations of National City Bank in the region.  Thus, in the 
area of their most significant competitive overlap, the merger implicated antitrust rules 
pertaining to mergers and triggered the imposition of the divestiture remedy.  Even with 
this structural remedy, however, the merger created the nation’s fifth largest bank with 
$289 billion in assets and about $180 billion in total deposits.  The $4.1 billion 
divestiture represented only a little more than 2% of the merging parties aggregate 
deposits.  See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department 
Requires Divestitures in Acquisition of National City Corporation by PNC Financial 
Services Group (Dec. 11, 2008), available at  http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
press_releases/2008/240315.pdf. 
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overlap and were waived through by antitrust and banking regulators 
without conditions or with minimal divestitures imposed as conditions 
for these approvals.103
What is missing from antitrust is any real discipline against the vast 
attenuated size and shape of the too-big-to-fail company.  Antitrust law 
contains no prohibition against size, and, instead, modern antitrust law 
probably coddles, more than it impedes, corporate expansion. 
  Thus, antitrust does not deter the existence of big 
firms by treating those with market power somewhat differently than 
those without it. 
 2. The Self-Inflicted Wound Problem 
The second difficulty with resorting to antitrust law to prevent 
colossal failures is that antitrust conduct standards do not restrict risk 
taking activity, even if the risks are obviously ill-advised.  A violation of 
antitrust law inflicts a wound on consumers and perhaps on rivals, but 
not on the actor.  All aspects of antitrust law prohibitions concur in this 
respect.  For example, monopoly law prohibits certain forms of 
predatory and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms that harm 
consumers and market competition by weakening or destroying the 
monopolist’s rivals or preventing their emergence into the 
marketplace.104  Merger prohibitions seek to prevent the acquisition of 
monopoly power for the same ultimate purpose.105  Similarly, conspiracy 
antitrust prohibitions target the combined exercise of market power to 
harm competition.106  No antitrust prohibition directs itself against harm 
a firm inflicts on itself.107
 
 103. See generally, Yomarie Silva, Note, The “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine and the 
Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115 (2009). 
  Rather, antitrust economics proceeds on the 
 104. “The conduct that § 2 brands as anticompetitive must… cause or threaten harm 
to consumers from lower market output, higher prices, reduced innovation, or some 
other indicator of diminished competitiveness.”  P. E. AREEDA AND H. HOVENKAMP, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 6.04 (2d ed. 2003). 
 105. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, §1 (“[M]ergers should not be 
permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise... A 
merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise 
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of 
diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”). 
 106. See, e.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (holding 
that the Sherman Act is directed, among other things, against combinations of power to 
control prices even in a “substantial part of the commerce in [a] commodity.”) 
 107. Some antitrust violations involve agreements that restrict the freedom of firms 
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assumption that all firms seek to maximize profits.  In order to maximize 
profits, firms must decide how much to produce and sell, and how to 
produce and sell it – that is, they must decide how to compete.  If a firm 
decides to take a risk in that endeavor, antitrust courts will not second-
guess it to block the taking of that risk ex ante or to punish it ex post.  
Antitrust fosters competition only by keeping it open, not by preventing 
it or directing companies in how to succeed or at least avoid failure. 
 
The too-big-to-fail firm threatens the economy by virtue of the 
wounds it inflicted upon itself, rather than by virtue of the wounds it 
inflicted on others for its own advancement.  Thus, the essential feature 
of a firm that has become too big to fail is that it has somehow 
threatened its own economic survival, generally by taking ill-advised 
risks or pursuing a disastrous business strategy.  If such a firm fails, it is, 
by definition, inefficient in the sense that the resources dedicated to the 
firm produced poor results.  However, supporting an inefficient 
participant’s existence in a market and averting its failure serves no 
antitrust objectives, even when the failure of such a firm would harm 
consumers by eliminating that firm’s rivalry.  If, instead, such a firm 
exits its market, thereby leaving its last standing rival with a monopoly, 
it is not the case (nor should it be) that the exiting firm violated the 
antitrust laws by closing up shop.  True, its conduct created a monopoly, 
but it created a monopoly in another firm rather than for itself.  Yet, 
absent a collusive deal in which the firm receives payment to exit the 
market, the mere act of departure is not illegal.  To hold otherwise 
would impose a sort of Iron Curtain around markets, forbidding 
departures on pain of civil or even criminal prosecution. 
Thus, antitrust law is directed at conduct that harms other firms, and 
not self-inflicted wounds that characterize the too-big-to-fail firm.  This 
creates a moral hazard problem, spurring the firm that is too big to fail to 
take risks that fall on someone other than the firm, and also leading to 
excessive and inefficient risk taking.  However, antitrust law is simply 
not directed at preventing even mindless leaps toward profits, even if the 
results of such conduct may very well inflict catastrophic consumer 
 
to expand their market share by competing, and in some sense thus involve what might 
be regarded as self-inflicted harm.  A market allocation or similar such restraint, 
however, is intended on balance to be profitable for the conspirators, and so impose no 
net harm on them.  The too-big-to-fail firm is one that is approaching collapse, and 
antitrust rules do not prohibit companies from collapsing. 
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harm. 
 3. The Incipiency Problem 
A final problem with the application of existing antitrust rules to the 
too-big-to-fail problem is the incipiency issue.  Mostly, antitrust law 
applies post hoc to condemn past conduct that has already interfered 
impermissibly with competitive markets.  Furthermore, standing and 
antitrust injury remedial standards for private litigation require proof 
that both the marketplace and the plaintiff suffered harm.108  Thus, most 
antitrust prohibitions do not reach incipient problems at all, and those 
few that do only apply to likely or probable violations.  For example, the 
standard for assessing most claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
the Rule of Reason, evaluates whether concerted action has had a net 
anticompetitive effect taking into account the history and nature of the 
restraint.109
There are, of course, antitrust statutes applicable to prevent 
incipient harm.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any transaction 
“where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in 
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”
  This standard scrutinizes alleged offenses under Section 1 
for past actual effects rather than projected future effects. 
110  
It seeks to forestall anticompetitive mergers “in their incipiency,” before 
their effects occur, and thus requires a prediction about the merger’s 
impact on future competition.111  Proving a Section 7 violation does not 
require showing that a merger has caused higher prices in the affected 
market, but, rather, “that the merger create an appreciable danger of such 
consequences in the future. A predictive judgment, necessarily 
probabilistic and judgmental rather than demonstrable is called for.”112  
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act also has prospective as 
well as post hoc reach.113
 
 108. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
  It has long been established that the FTC can 
 109. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007). 
 110. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (2010). 
 111. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). 
 112. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 113. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (2010) (“(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are 
hereby declared unlawful.”)  Subsection (2) empowers the Commission to “prevent 
persons… from using unfair methods of competition….” but excludes, among other 
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challenge as an unfair method of competition prohibited by Section 5 
any conduct that would be unlawful under the antitrust laws, as well as 
conduct that threatens to become a violation.  Thus, in FTC v. Motion 
Picture Advertising Servs. Co.,114 the Supreme Court concluded that the 
Commission can proceed under Section 5 to prohibit in their incipiency 
practices that threatened to become a Sherman Act violation when fully 
grown.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
Commission challenges under Section 5 without requiring proof of 
market power or anticompetitive effects, affirming the FTC’s “power 
under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.”115  Finally, the 
prohibition in Section 2 of the Sherman Act against attempted 
monopolization reaches incipient problems, condemning conduct that 
presents a dangerous likelihood of successful monopolization.116
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which 
the law seeks to prevent — for instance, the monopoly — but require 
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that 
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to 
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen . . . But when that 
intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, 
like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs 
itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the 
completed result.
  As 
Justice Holmes observed in Swift & Co. v. United States: 
117
A too-big-to-fail problem is one of layered contingencies.  As 
explored above, one element of a too-big-to-fail problem is the broader 
economic context in which a company’s imminent threatened failure 
occurs.  At the time when firms like AIG and Bear Sterns were rescued, 
many other economic problems of national scope had already 
accumulated before the bailout decisions had to be made.
 
118
 
industries, banking from the reach of this power. 
  It is 
uncertain, if not doubtful, whether the bailout of any single firm would 
have been considered a pressing need had the surrounding circumstances 
been less threatening.  In any event, a firm is only in the requisite sense 
too-big-to-fail if it is very big and deeply integral to broader economic 
 114. 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953). 
 115. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillen, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993). 
 116. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
 117. Id. at 396. 
 118. MURPHY, supra note 17, at 2-4. 
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activity that depends upon it, and also if there are economic conditions 
surrounding the corporate crisis rendering the imminent failure 
unacceptably catastrophic.  If AIG was too big to allow its demise in the 
fall of 2008 when these problems coalesced, was it also “too big” during 
the housing boom that was in full bloom just months earlier?  Had it 
failed in 2006, would the government have had any reason to intervene 
to prevent collapse?  At what point along the pathway towards a full-
blown catastrophe does the incipient problem become palpable enough 
to raise the specter of bailouts or some alternative governmental 
intervention?  By the same token, at what point could antitrust 
intervention, if it is available, be expected to kick in?  The point of 
intervention would not be to punish or exact damages, but to prevent 
catastrophe.  However, any intervention, whether from antitrust or other 
sources, would face significant difficulties anticipating the contingencies 
involved, including the potential for an adverse turn of events in the 
broader economic context and the likely effects of a particular 
company’s interrelations with others in the event that it failed.  
Moreover, antitrust law, in particular, is limited by various doctrines that 
preclude intervention based on speculation.119
Even the antitrust statutes with some preventive reach are of limited 
use in forestalling a catastrophic business collapse because the narrow 
range of possibilities against which Post-Chicago substantive antitrust 
guards barely overlaps with the possibilities that a catastrophic potential 
failure portend.  For antitrust incipiency statutes to intervene to avert a 
too-big-to-fail scenario would require an imminent threat of the right 
sort.  Under existing antitrust laws that are based on Post-Chicago 
assumptions, it is theoretically possible that intervention could happen, 
but it will be the unusual case to be sure.  Section 2’s prohibition against 
 
 
 119. For example, causation and standing in antitrust jurisprudence are restrictive 
concepts, limiting damage claims to plaintiffs whose injuries are direct.  In Assoc. Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), the 
Court held that a union lacked standing to challenge a boycott against unionized firms 
on the ground that the injury was too indirect and speculative, notwithstanding that 
there was not real doubt that the boycott had injured union firms.  See LAWRENCE A. 
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 
925 (2000).  Similarly, the indirect purchaser damages exclusion established in Ill. 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), denies a damages remedy to indirect 
purchasers from a price-fixing cartel again without serious doubt that downstream 
customers are often harmed, but out of concern for burdening federal courts with 
imponderable antitrust damages apportionment problems.  Id. at 478-79. 
2011] THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES 297 
TO THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PHENOMENON 
 
attempted monopolization seems of no possible application outside the 
coincidental circumstance in which a very big company is both headed 
for a train wreck and happens, at the same time, to be conducting its 
business with unlawful intent and the likely effect of maintaining or 
creating a monopoly.  This case will be the exceptional circumstance 
almost by definition: a company is unlikely to become a monopoly at the 
same time as it is likely to fail.  The more plausible candidates for 
intercepting a too-big-to-fail failure are Section 5 of the FTC Act and 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
 4. The Current Reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act 
Is it, or could it be, a violation of Section 5 for a company to engage 
in some form of risky conduct that poses a threat to its own survival and 
creates a strong possibility of governmental protection or bailout?  If so, 
at what point in time along the continuum of events would that conduct 
rise to the level of an “unfair method of competition”?  Is it “unfair” in 
the requisite sense for a firm to take unreasonable risks that its smaller 
rivals cannot afford to take given an imbalance in the likelihood of 
governmental rescue for the “too-big-to-fail” company? 
Section 5 is an adaptable statute by its nature.  It proscribes “unfair 
methods of competition,” which the Supreme Court has found to be a 
concept that is “flexible . . . with evolving content.”120  The Court has 
repeatedly held that the meaning of “unfair methods of competition” can 
be ascertained only on a case-by-case basis by the “gradual process of 
judicial inclusion and exclusion.”121  The results of judicial articulation 
of the concept have been inconclusive and spotty, but a few points have 
emerged.  First, Section 5 prohibits whatever is also prohibited by the 
antitrust laws (subject to certain jurisdictional limitations of the FTC 
Act).122
 
 120. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). 
  However, Section 5 is not confined to conduct that violates 
antitrust law: 
 121. FTC v. Raladam Co., 284 U.S. 643, 648 (1931). 
 122. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986); United States v. Am. 
Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279 n.7 (1975); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 
316, 321-22 (1966); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 
(1953); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953), reh’g 
denied, 345 U.S. 914 (1953); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 690, 693 (1948), 
reh’g denied, 334 U.S. 839 (1948). 
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In the area of anticompetitive practices, the FTC Act functions as a 
kind of penumbra around the federal antitrust statutes. An 
anticompetitive practice need not violate the Sherman Act or the 
Clayton Act in order to violate the FTC Act . . . However, the scope 
of the FTC is nonetheless linked to the antitrust laws.  The power of 
the Federal Trade Commission to declare anticompetitive trade 
practices “unfair” extends primarily to “trade practices which 
conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
even though such practices may not actually violate those laws.”123
Thus, conduct that may fall outside the reach of the antitrust laws 
for technical reasons may violate Section 5, such as an invitation to fix 
prices where no agreement to do so is actually formed.
 
124
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the 
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to 
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but 
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of 
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the 
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
  Moreover, 
since as long ago as 1972, the Supreme Court has held that conduct that 
does not implicate antitrust law or policy may fall within the potential 
reach of Section 5: 
125
The sweep of Section 5’s “unfair methods of competition” has been 
regarded as a broad grant of authority that affords the agency power to 
intervene to protect the public against practices that may defy 
categorization.  For example, a company using deceptive advertising, 
intentionally or not, that other companies complying with the Act do not 
use, creates an unfair advantage over its competitors.
 
126
 
 123. Chuck’s Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (dictum) (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. at 321). 
  Conduct that is 
legally proper, such as bringing lawsuits in courts of proper venue, has 
been held to be an unfair method of competition where the defendants in 
those lawsuits were consumers who were disadvantaged by having to 
travel long distances to defend themselves against the plaintiff 
 124. See In re Quality Trailer Prods., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,247 (Aug. 11, 
1992); see also In re YKK (U.S.A.), Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 19,454 (Apr. 14, 1993), 58 Fed 
Reg. 41,790 (Aug. 5, 1993) (consent decree); In re AE Clevite, Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 
17,405 (Apr. 2, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 35,459 (July 1, 1993) (consent decree). 
 125. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). 
 126. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1967). 
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corporation’s charges.127  However, courts have imposed limitations on 
the scope of Section 5 in the interest of predictability, especially where 
the conduct is outside the reach of antitrust laws.  Where “unfairness” is 
applied to conduct that is not measurable by unfairness standards under 
other statutes, “standards for determining whether it is ‘unfair’ within 
the meaning of § 5 must be formulated to discriminate between normally 
acceptable business behavior and conduct that is unreasonable or 
unacceptable.”128
The conduct that creates a too-big-to-fail problem can fall into an 
infinite variety of categories, some of which Section 5 intervention 
might theoretically reach.  First, of course, growth is often accomplished 
by mergers and acquisitions.  The antitrust standard for such a 
transaction is only implicated where market power is increased, but 
Section 5 could reach further.  For example, the FTC might block a 
conglomerate merger on the grounds that the scale efficiencies or other 
putative benefits from the combination are outweighed by looming 
indispensability problems, particularly if the moral hazard created by the 
merger gave the merging firms an unfair advantage over smaller rivals 
who could not rely on bailouts. 
 
The market extension mergers in the banking industry, again, 
provide an excellent example.  Suppose that Bank A is the dominant 
commercial bank in Region A, and it acquires Banks B, C and D, which 
each dominate in their respective Regions B, C and D.  By hypothesis, 
none of these banks competes with the others, such that the merger is not 
horizontal and likely does not provoke any resistance under Section 7.129
 
 127. Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 294 (1976). 
  
While the failure of pre-merger Bank A standing alone might pose a 
significant but manageable clean-up problem for the Federal Reserve 
System, at some point, that will no longer be the case if Bank A merges 
with enough dominant banks in enough geographic markets.  
Eventually, market extension mergers can and do create banks that 
cannot be allowed to fail.  If it is additionally supposed that it would be 
economically rational for post-merger Bank A to take advantage of its 
too-big-to-fail status, such as by engaging in high-risk-high-return 
 128. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 129. For purposes of antitrust analysis, geographic market extension mergers are 
essentially no different from product market extension mergers. In 1998, for example, 
Citi Group acquired Travelers, extending its banking business into the business of 
insurance. 
300 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
lending on a global scale with the expectation of federal rescue if risks 
materialize, is that an “unfair method of competition”?  If so, are the 
mergers that position Bank A to engage in that unfair method of 
competition also unfair, or is it too speculative even for the incipiency 
standards of Section 5?  There is no case authority to resolve this, but at 
least one current Commissioner controversially believes that Section 5 
plausibly applies.130
5. Consolidation, Efficiency and the Current Reach  
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, containing the principal federal 
statutory provision governing mergers, provides that: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part 
of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole 
or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce 
or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.131
As currently understood, Section 7 of the Clayton Act represents no 
particular objection to size, and instead concerns itself with 
combinations that create market power or facilitate its exercise.  Policy 
makers have sometimes toyed with the idea of limiting mergers of large 
and leading companies, but those proposals have not been implemented 
or enacted into law.
 
132
 
 130. See Rosch, supra note 20, at 8. 
  Indeed, the failed attempts to outlaw mergers 
exceeding specified size thresholds make clear that existing law does not 
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2010). 
 132. See, e.g., Phil C. Neal, REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON 
ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REC. 13,890 (1969) (recommending limiting certain 
acquisitions by firms having $250 million in sales or $500 million in assets of leading 
firms in concentrated markets; in 1979 a bill was introduced in the Senate that would 
have prohibited mergers between a companies with sales or assets exceeding $2 billion 
as well as smaller mergers in concentrated markets); Donald I. Baker & Karen L. 
Grimm, S. 600 – An Unnecessary and Dangerous Foray into Classic Populism, 40 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 847 (1979). 
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prohibit such transactions.133
The most influential interpretation of this broadly-worded statute is 
embodied in federal agency guidelines rather than judicial opinions, 
largely because the Supreme Court has only rarely taken cases that 
would allow it to expand on the statute’s meaning.
  Section 7 instead limits aggregations of 
market power, rather than size – and the two do not correlate.  
Conglomerate mergers can be very large without affecting concentration 
in any relevant economic market, and thus very large mergers are 
permitted in very large markets. 
134  As the Merger 
Guidelines make clear at the outset: “The unifying theme of the 
Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance 
market power or to facilitate its exercise. . . . [T]he result of the exercise 
of market power is a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a 
misallocation of resources.”135
 
 133. In response to the current crisis, legislation has been proposed to enable 
regulators to dismantle or impose discipline on any firm that poses a too-big-to-fail risk.  
A proposal by Congressman Kanjorski of Pennsylvania would empower a newly-
created financial industry regulatory Council to make determinations about the size, 
scope of operations, business relationships and interconnectedness, and mix of activities 
of the largest financial services businesses and to impose, among other things, 
divestiture to unaffiliated companies upon a finding of systemic risk. This provision 
would not amend Section 7 but might cast a different light on it.  H. Amdt. 527, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (unenacted). 
  The evaluation of the legality of a 
merger under the 1992 Guidelines, which is also generally followed by 
the courts, proceeds by defining the relevant markets in which the 
transaction may increase concentration and then by measuring its 
concentration effects, taking certain defenses and justifications into 
account as to transactions that otherwise exceed stated permissible 
concentration thresholds.  Nothing in the case law or the 1992 
Guidelines addresses the problem of unwieldy size or the possibility that 
the resulting firm might wield intolerable political power or present 
unacceptable risks of its own failure.  Size does not constitute a valid 
basis for disapproving a merger under the Guidelines analysis, and so it 
is no surprise to find that mergers of enormous size are routinely 
approved by antitrust enforcers and federal courts applying Section 7. 
 134. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71.  The Supreme Court’s most recent 
antitrust merger case was in 1990, and concerned remedies of private parties under 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act rather than substantive standards.  California v. Am. 
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990). 
 135. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 0.1. 
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One increasingly important defense is the presence of merger-
specific efficiencies, since scale efficiencies are often articulated as a 
motivation for many mergers.  At one time, efficiencies justifications for 
mergers were largely ignored on the grounds that even the most 
anticompetitive transactions will create some efficiencies.  In 1967, the 
Supreme Court held that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a 
defense to illegality.  Congress was aware that some mergers which 
lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance 
in favor of protecting competition.”136  Intervening years and the 
emergence of the Chicago School brought an increased tolerance of 
potential anticompetitive effects that are now regarded as potentially 
offset by merger specific efficiencies.  In 1997, the FTC and U.S. 
Department of Justice expanded the efficiencies provisions of the 
Merger Guidelines in an effort to delineate how the agencies will 
evaluate claimed efficiencies and balance them against potential adverse 
competitive effects from mergers.137  An FTC study published in 2009 
reviewed the agency’s experience with efficiencies justifications that 
had been proffered for mergers over a ten-year period.138  Of 118 
mergers that were the subject of Bureau of Economics staff memoranda, 
50 transactions presented at least one efficiency-related justification.139 
Efficiencies arguments fared reasonably well at the agency, with the 
Bureau of Economics accepting roughly 27% of all efficiencies 
justifications advocated for merger transactions during the study 
period.140
While efficiencies of scale are considered in approving transactions, 
inefficiencies of scale are not, such that mergers resulting in inefficiently 
large scale are not disapproved on that particular ground.  It is likely that 
at least some mega-mergers have had adverse effects on overall 
efficiency by creating out-sized firms.  However, antitrust hardly puts in 
place an “inefficiency filter” to block big mergers that do not create or 
 
 
 136. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
 137. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4. 
 138. MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, FED. TRADE COMM’N, MERGER 
EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: 1997– 2007 (2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 34, tbl.1. 
 140. Id. at 35.  Data were also reported for the Bureau of Competition, which 
reached substantially similar results, although there was some disparity between the two 
wings of the agency.  Acceptance or rejection of efficiency defenses by either bureau 
was not necessarily reflected in the ultimate determination by the agency itself. 
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enhance the exercise of market power even if the merged firm is simply 
unwieldy.  For example, certain high-profile mega-mergers have proved 
to have been ill-conceived and inefficient, such as AOL’s $182 billion 
merger with Time Warner in 2001.  The combination was touted as 
creating a digital media powerhouse with the potential to reach every 
American with a computer or a television set.  The FTC approved the 
merger under a consent decree that sought to prevent Time Warner from 
exploiting market power in broadband by discriminating or denying 
access in connection with its cable system,141 which serviced roughly 
20% of U.S. households.142  The concept of the merger proved to be so 
ill-advised that within five years Time Warner could not find a buyer for 
AOL and was forced to spin off the failed internet access and online 
advertising business.143
At least some scholarly support exists for the proposition that many 
mega-mergers in the United States and globally in recent years have 
created outsized firms far surpassing efficient scale, resulting in 
unwieldy and inefficient, rather than more competitive, enterprises.  In 
many industries, including financial services, the minimum efficient 
scale has increased over time along with technological advances, 
deregulation and other developments.  However, it seems likely that 
merger size has grown at a much larger rate, casting some doubt on the 
notion that bank mega-mergers are generally necessary to achieve scale 
efficiencies.  As long ago as 1993, a scholarly assessment of merger 
activity in the banking industry concluded that x-efficiency, or 
managerial ability to control costs, played a substantially greater role 
than scale efficiencies in the overall performance of banks, and that bank 
mergers often did not yield any scale efficiencies at all.
  The combined assets did not work efficiently 
together.  One can of course debate whether the FTC’s ex ante review 
(or the parties themselves) should have anticipated the inefficiencies 
inherent in that transaction, but, even if it had, current antitrust law 
would have offered it no grounds on which to oppose the transaction. 
144
 
 141. In re America Online, Inc. and Time-Warner, Inc., Agreement Containing 
Consent Orders, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/ 
aolconsent.pdf. 
  Subsequent 
 142. See In re America Online, Inc. and Time-Warner, Inc , Analysis of Proposed 
Consent Order To Aid Public Comment (Dec. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf. 
 143. Shira Ovide & Emily Steel, It’s Now Official: AOL, Time Warner to Split, 
WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at B1. 
 144. See Dean Amel et al., Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A 
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scholarly assessments of consolidation and efficiency in financial 
services markets echo similar observations.145  One study concluded: 
“Ex post results of M&As seem to contradict the motivations given by 
practitioners for consolidation, which are largely related to issues of 
economies of scale and scope and to improvements in management 
quality.”146  Mega-mergers are more or less routine, and have rarely 
been blocked by antitrust agencies, at least not since the much-
disparaged cases like Von’s Grocery three decades back.147  In 2008, for 
example, InBev’s $52 billion acquisition of Anheuser-Busch topped the 
list of mergers exceeding $2 billion.148
Notwithstanding credible arguments that some mega-mergers 
deliver scale inefficiencies, Section 7 does not put the courts or agencies 
in a position to second-guess the desirability of a merger that is 
otherwise lawful.  Horizontal mergers of enormous size are not 
objectionable under current standards, which are quite relaxed by 
comparison with historic standards or even standards imposed in certain 
other jurisdictions.  Furthermore, by definition, conglomerate mergers 
do not aggregate horizontal market power and are essentially beyond the 
reach of Post-Chicago antitrust law.  Conglomerate mergers, therefore, 
can create behemoth enterprises of ungainly and inefficient proportions 
with impunity.  An efficiencies defense might be of interest for certain 
horizontal mergers, but no defense based on efficiency or otherwise is 
required, or even relevant, to a merger that does not increase 
concentration or pose a vertical foreclosure problem.  Conglomerate and 
market extension mergers do neither.  Thus, the existing antitrust law 
approach to mergers and acquisitions could do almost nothing to prevent 
the accumulation of resources into a poorly positioned firm whose own 
failure would also risk broader systemic failure. 
 
 
Review of the International Evidence, Aug. 2002), available at www.federalreserve.gov 
/pubs/feds/2002/200247/200247pap.pdf. 
 145. See id. 
  146. See id at 42. 
 147. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 148. See, Dept. of Justice Press Release approving merger with modifications, 
available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-1008.html. For a summary 
of data on mergers and acquisitions ranked by size, see generally INSTITUTE ON 
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND ALLIANCES STATISTICS, available at http://www.imaa-
institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions.html.  See also JOHN WILLIAMSON, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., LARGEST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY CORPORATIONS IN 2008 2 
(2009). 
2011] THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES 305 
TO THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PHENOMENON 
 
Therefore, Post-Chicago antitrust is not a public policy weapon of 
much use in preventing too-big-to-fail problems.  As a general matter, 
Post-Chicago theory concerns itself more with over-deterrence than 
under-deterrence, embodies laissez-faire tendencies relying on markets 
to self-correct, and, most importantly, applies antitrust law to enhance 
allocative efficiency to the virtual exclusion of other societal values.  
The too-big-to-fail problem barely intersects with the problem of 
optimizing allocative efficiency and, for the same reason, barely invites 
antitrust intervention of any sort.  The only limitation on this conclusion 
is the possibility that Section 5 of the FTC Act might sometimes be 
invoked to prevent or dismantle an out-sized merger that created a 
substantial likelihood of “unfairness,” based on a rational economic 
expectation that the merged firm would operate under presumed bailout 
protection. 
 
IV. COULD ANTITRUST LAW HELP? 
Since Post-Chicago antitrust has very little to contribute in 
combating the too-big-to-fail problem, the natural question becomes: 
could antitrust do a better job without doing violence to fundamental 
doctrine?  Responding to this question presents particular difficulty 
because what “fundamental antitrust doctrine” comprises has never been 
altogether clear.  Indeed, antitrust doctrine has shifted around over time.  
However, at one time, antitrust had a broader reach than it currently 
does, and the very dynamism of antitrust law could theoretically free up 
courts to restore some or all of that earlier reach, or perhaps even give 
antitrust another new face, as was done by the Chicago School 
revolution.  Also, whatever “fundamental antitrust doctrine” means, it 
ought to at least include the important and uncontroversial advances that 
the law made in response to advances in the field of economics.  For 
example, “restoring” antitrust should not entail reversing course to re-
declare all vertical territorial exclusivity agreements per se illegal  
because the potential efficiencies from such arrangements are 
uncontroverted.  Contrastingly, “restoring” the law’s original distrust of 
highly concentrated market structures would not ignore any important or 
uncontroversial advances in economics. 
If, as is probably the case, many too-big-to-fail companies are in 
markets that are highly concentrated (the measurement of which, in turn, 
might be open to redesign), then perhaps prophylactic antitrust rules 
306 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
could be fashioned to forestall at least some systemic failures.  Given the 
very high costs of the recent systemic failures, it might be worth 
imposing such newly-fashioned antitrust rules even at some more 
modest expense in terms of efficiency.  Moreover, efficiency claims 
made by some too-big-to-fail firms lack much empirical support or even 
prima facie plausibility, and so the social costs of dismantling a few 
potentially catastrophic firms may be less than advertised in some 
quarters.  Finally, there is no reason in principle why antitrust must 
remain rigidly devoted to economics-based policy as its sole source of 
direction. 
There is also a substantial difference between preventing and curing 
too-big-to-fail problems.  Even current antitrust law ought to help make 
corrections when markets have failed.  It is not surprising that the 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Christine Varney, concluded in 
the midst of the recent crisis that: “First, there is no adequate substitute 
for a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress. 
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in 
the Government’s response to economic crises to ensure that markets 
remain competitive.”149  As Professor Maurice Stucke observes (echoing 
many others), “antitrust enforcement is not a luxury reserved for more 
prosperous times.”150
A. HARNESSING THE DYNAMISM OF ANTITRUST 
  Thus, antitrust might play an important curative 
role after a too-big-to-fail crisis.  Moreover, if restoring competition in 
the wake of collapse is an important public policy tool for redressing the 
problem, it also seems well worth considering whether the enforcement 
of competition law in advance of a collapse might play a preventative 
role. 
Antitrust law cannot help avert the need for too-big-to-fail bailouts 
unless it adapts to address some of the sources of the problem.  
However, antitrust is a legal system whose rules are formed and applied 
with very specific reference to the policies underlying the law.  Those 
policies have proved to be subject to dramatic changes over time in 
 
 149. Christine A. Varney, Address Before the Center for American Progress: 
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in a Challenging Era (May 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf. 
 150. Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism 20 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies 
Research, Paper No. 1323815, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323815. 
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response to evolutions in the economy, developments in the related field 
of economics, and trends in society and politics.  As policies have 
changed, so have antitrust rules.  Therefore, there is no reason to believe 
that antitrust law has settled once and for all upon Post-Chicago policy 
and theory.  Indeed, the history of antitrust policy is instructive as to this 
unlikelihood. 
The public policies embodied in the nation’s antitrust laws have 
never been precisely clear, but, clearly, antitrust policy has been 
anything but stagnant.  While some adherents of the Chicago School 
have advocated an exclusive focus on consumer welfare, defined as 
allocative efficiency, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
never gone that far.151  Moreover, antitrust policy has undergone broad 
historic shifts.  It evolves, sometimes through legislative reform, 
sometimes by judicial reinterpretation, and at other times by policy 
statements of federal and state enforcement agencies.  Indeed, United 
States antitrust law has had a rich and varied history in Congress, the 
courts and enforcement agencies.  A detailed tracing of shifts in policy 
underpinnings through time is complex and beyond the scope of this 
article,152
Antitrust as a legislative response to large enterprise has a 
particularly significant and uneven history.  While the current policy 
devotion to allocative efficiency regards bigness in a neutral or 
positively favorable manner, antitrust policies of an earlier era viewed 
the presence of large corporations as posing a variety of dangers to our 
economy.  The early sweeping construction of the Sherman Act 
mirrored the prevailing public fear and mistrust of large corporations.
 but it is important here to understand how modern antitrust 
law came to sharpen and narrow its focus on the objective of allocative 
efficiency, or consumer welfare, and how momentous a policy shift was 
required to bring us to the narrow Post-Chicago approach. 
153  
In fact, the name “antitrust” derives from the peculiar form of business 
organization, the “trust,” that was used to aggregate large business 
enterprises under unitary control, in circumvention of the constraints of 
19th Century state corporations codes.154
 
 151. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 56 – 77 (4th ed. 2005). 
  Early in the 20th Century, the 
Supreme Court overruled Trans-Missouri Freight and introduced the 
 152. For an interesting summary of the evolution of antitrust policy, see id. 
 153. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).  
 154. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 6. 
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“rule of reason” in its controversial Standard Oil decision, which was 
perceived at the time as limiting the reach of the law – although notably 
the decision broke apart the Standard Oil trust.155  A few years later, in 
1914, Congress passed what many regarded as remedial legislation in 
the Clayton Act.156
If it be true that size and power, apart from the way in which they 
were acquired, or the purpose with which they are used, do not 
offend against the law, it is equally true that one of the designs of the 
framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to prevent the concentration in a 
few hands of control over great industries.  They preferred a social 
and industrial state in which there should be many independent 
producers.  Size and power are themselves facts some of whose 
consequences do not depend upon the way in which they were 
created or in which they are used.  It is easy to conceive that they 
might be acquired honestly and used as fairly as men who are in 
business for the legitimate purpose of making money for themselves 
and their associates could be expected to use them, human nature 
being what it is, and for all that constitute a public danger, or at all 
events give rise to difficult social, industrial and political 
problems.
  In the 1921 decision of United States v. American 
Can Co., the District Court reaffirmed the prevailing view that antitrust 
law was designed to address “a public danger” from big business, and a 
preference, therefore, for smaller business: 
157
 
 155. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).  The Court in 
Standard Oil sustained a decree that required the dismantling of the Standard Oil trust, 
but the rule of reason announced in the case was regarded by Progressives and others as 
weakening the law.  Justice Harlan’s dissent exclaimed that “the action of the court in 
this case might well alarm thoughtful men who revered the Constitution.”  Id. at 104. 
 
 156. In the presidential election of 1912, antitrust was an important issue that 
brought sometimes fierce debate among Woodrow Wilson, William Howard Taft and 
Theodore Roosevelt.  Once elected, President Wilson pressed for the enactment of the 
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.).  See J.P. MILLER, Woodrow Wilson’s 
Contributions to Antitrust Policy, in THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES OF WOODROW 
WILSON, 132 et seq. (Earl Latham ed., 1958). 
 157. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 902 (D. Md. 1916), appeal 
dismissed 256 U.S. 706 (1921).  Despite the court’s recognition of these policy 
concerns about “size and power” it went on to withhold the government’s requested 
decree to break up the company because however large and powerful it was, the 
defendant had not misbehaved.  “[Congress] has not yet been willing to go far in the 
way of regulating and controlling corporations merely because they are large and 
powerful, perhaps because many people have always felt that government control is in 
itself an evil, and to be avoided whenever it is not absolutely required for the prevention 
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In the decades following, enforcement priorities were mixed, with 
relatively lax regulation of industrial concentration,158 but more 
aggressive enforcement against certain forms of unfair or exclusive 
conduct, such as resale price maintenance,159 exclusive dealing,160 and 
anticompetitive trade association activity.161  In the 1930s and 1940s, 
following a brief relaxation of antitrust rules under the Codes of Fair 
Competition,162 federal antitrust enforcement expanded to attack 
monopolies,163 vertical integration,164 and various forms of tacit 
collusion.165  At its extreme, the preference for small enterprise was 
embodied in the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act.166  Beginning 
around 1950, with the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amendments to 
the Clayton Act,167 federal antitrust policy became explicit in regarding 
large enterprise with some degree of suspicion.  In Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, the Supreme Court explained the Celler-Kefauver 
amendments as stemming from “a fear of what was considered to be a 
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy,” and 
recited an array of public policies behind that enactment, including 
economic efficiency, inherent dangers of unchecked corporate 
expansion, desirability of local control over industry, protection of small 
business, and “the threat to other values” aside from economic ones.168
 
of greater wrong.” Id. 
  
 158. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
 159. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v. A. 
Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 
(1922). 
 160. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923). 
 161. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Am. 
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Maple Flooring 
Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
 162. The Codes of Fair Competition under the National Recovery Administration 
(“NRA”) provided an avenue for antitrust exemptions for corporations that complied 
with the standards set out.  See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM 
OF MONOPOLY (1966).  The NRA and the Codes of Fair Competition barely took effect 
before losing public support and eventual condemnation by the Supreme Court in 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 164. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures., 334 U.S. 131 (1947). 
 165. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1950). 
 168. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962). 
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Influential economists in the 1950s and 1960s fueled the most 
aggressive period of antitrust enforcement against industry 
concentration, believing that market structure drove marketplace 
performance, ultimately culminating in the 1968 Justice Department 
Merger Guidelines.169
In addressing the too-big-to-fail issue, it is thus important to 
recognize that as recently as the 1970s, the antitrust laws were still 
understood by at least the courts and some leading scholars to promote a 
rich mix of social, political and economic objectives.
 
170  These included, 
among others: advancing economic efficiency, innovation and consumer 
welfare; the protection of individual traders and their business freedom 
against certain kinds of private interference; the prevention of 
antidemocratic political pressures that might flow from concentrations of 
economic power and wealth; limiting wealth transfers from consumers 
to monopolies and cartels; and (at various times and in varying degrees) 
limiting the growth of big business as an end in itself.171
The primary purpose of antitrust is to perpetuate and preserve a 
system of governance for a competitive, free enterprise economy.  
Efficiency and consumer welfare constitute ancillary benefits that are 
expected to flow from a system of economic freedom.  Like the U.S. 
Constitution, antitrust is concerned primarily with process and only 
secondarily with outcomes. Antitrust calls for a dispersion of power, 
buttressed by built-in checks and balances, to guard against the abuse 
of power and to preserve not only individual freedom, but also more 
importantly a free system.  Antitrust is founded on a theory of 
hostility toward private concentration of power so great that even a 
democratic government can be entrusted with it only in exceptional 
circumstances.
  Walter Adams 
and James W. Brock wrote in 1991: 
172
 
 169. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71.  See generally, CARL KAYSEN & 
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959); 
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES 
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); THEODORE P. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST 
POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1980). 
 
 170. See generally, SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, 11-15; Pitofsky, supra 
note 2. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust & Enforceability: An 
Empirical Perspective, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS 
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Some of these policies do not seem so far removed from the too-
big-to-fail problem. The preference for small over large enterprise as an 
end in itself bears directly on the matter.  Similarly, the preference for 
local control over industry, the aim to protect small businessmen and 
women from oppression by gigantic corporations, and the desire to 
shield democratic institutions from the corrupting influence of 
concentrations of wealth might all speak to the problem.  Indeed, it may 
be that the emergence of a too-big-to-fail enterprise violates every single 
policy, other than allocative efficiency, that has ever been mentioned in 
connection with the Sherman Act.  Moreover, it can also be argued that 
even the more strictly economics-driven underpinnings of antitrust have 
unnecessarily disregarded the problem of corporate size by ignoring 
diseconomies of scale, allowing conglomerate and market extension 
merger activity even where consumer welfare may be harmed by 
shifting resources into ungainly enterprises and squandering the output, 
price and innovation advantages of smaller enterprise.  Given the 
dynamism of antitrust law and policy, there is good reason to consider a 
new dynamic shift. 
B. WAS THE PARADOX REALLY SO BAD? 
Of course, it is one thing to note that antitrust policy is dynamic 
enough to adapt to the too-big-to-fail problem, but quite another to 
conclude that it ought to adapt.  Many good reasons explain why the 
older order of antitrust broke down and gave way to the Chicago School.  
However, some of those reasons now seem to have been overstated, and 
the antitrust “paradox” that launched the Chicago School antitrust 
movement has its own problems.  Robert Bork successfully advocated 
that pre-Chicago School antitrust policy was paradoxical and “at war” 
with itself.173
 
ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICY 152-60 (Harry First et al., eds. 1991). 
  More specifically, he argued that there had never been any 
policy underpinning to antitrust other than allocative efficiency and that, 
by embracing other policies, courts had created an internally inconsistent 
law that sought to promote efficiency but also rewarded inefficient firms 
with viable antitrust claims.  However, was it really so bad for a statute 
with the breadth and importance of the Sherman Act to embrace 
multiple policies that sometimes were in tension with one another?  
Even if the answer is yes, which is not clear, was abandoning all 
 173. See BORK, supra note 51. 
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antitrust policies aside from allocative efficiency really always in the 
best interests of consumers, or were Bork’s laissez-faire achievements 
instead in the interests of the corporations to which consumers turn for 
goods and services?  Finally, have laissez-faire policies themselves led 
to the paradoxical result that government ultimately has been forced to 
take a greater role in the private sector? 
It was an overstatement to say that antitrust never was concerned 
with anything except allocative efficiency or that antitrust policy never 
objected to large enterprise for other reasons.  In fact, that assertion 
behind the Chicago School argument is bizarrely at odds with history.  
Nearly 100 years ago, Justice Harlan described the Sherman Act as 
arising from a universal conviction that “the country was in real danger 
from another kind of slavery . . . that would result from the aggregations 
of capital in the hands of a few.”174
Furthermore, it is arguable that laissez-faire policies indeed yielded 
a paradox of their own by bringing about the recent need for massive 
government intrusion into the private sector.  In what has turned out to 
be a prescient warning about the perils of the then-emergent Chicago 
School, in 1979, Robert Pitofsky wrote: 
  That was not a statement about 
allocative efficiency.  As discussed above, the first 100 years of antitrust 
jurisprudence seem to contain an unwavering commitment to a number 
of competing policies sometimes acknowledged to be in tension with 
one another. 
It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain political 
values in interpreting the antitrust laws.  By ‘political values,’ I 
mean, first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power 
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and, second, a desire to 
enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range 
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere 
controls the welfare of all.  A third and overriding political concern 
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop 
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the 
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate 
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more 
intrusive role in economic affairs.175
This final prediction could not have been more accurate.  The 
 
 
 174. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 175. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1051 (emphasis added). 
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emergence of a few corporate giants that were left to take under-
regulated risks and to grow without significant government intervention 
eventually forced the United States government to become the largest 
investor in the U.S. automobile industry, a controlling owner of some of 
the largest banks and other financial institutions in the country, as well 
as to infuse hundreds of billions of dollars into the private financial 
sector in the form of equity investments, loans and loan guarantees.176  
The government has also injected federal funds into the home mortgage 
refinance marketplace to forestall foreclosures.177  All of this bailout 
activity came with unavoidable pressures for governmental control over 
a range of private enterprise decision making, even including 
management compensation. Additional government intervention of a 
more durable sort also seems inevitable as Congress and regulatory 
agencies respond to a stinging public backlash against a government that 
is perceived (rightly or not) to have let the country’s booming economy 
disintegrate.  Federal and state regulation addressing dozens of areas of 
economic activity including real estate mortgage lending practices, 
trading in derivatives and other securities, solvency of financial 
institutions, management compensation and corporate governance has 
been enacted or is under consideration.178
Which paradox is worse?  One problem with myopic attention to 
allocative efficiency is that consumers could be worse off if firms must 
be too big to fail to achieve optimum scale.  The too-big-to-fail problem 
never figured into economic arguments for “letting the marketplace 
decide,” and it changes the equation.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that banks in the United States really need to be as big as the nation just 
permitted them to become to compete for one-stop-shopping corporate 
customers in the global financial services markets.  That is, suppose that 
 All of this can, in some 
measure, be attributed to inadequate government oversight of sectors of 
the economy that are “dominated by a few corporate giants.”  Thus the 
new paradox: laissez-faire policies that have led to unprecedented 
government intervention in the private sector. 
 
 176. See generally, BAILOUTS: PUBLIC MONEY, PRIVATE PROFIT (Wright, Robert E. 
ed. 2009). 
 177. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 178. See, e.g., Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613; 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765; 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
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their current gigantic size has not yet crested optimum efficient scale.  
That does not necessarily mean that their gigantic size could not pose a 
threat of greater consumer harm than would follow from the marginal 
loss of scale efficiency that would result (by hypothesis, at least) if the 
banks were required to be a bit smaller.  Certainly, some consumer harm 
has resulted from the too-big-to-fail problem even if one assumes that 
these same firms were generating economies of scale as they claim.  
Commissioner Rosch correctly noted that the failure of a too-big-to-fail 
enterprise causes consumer harm in the form of reduced output, 
resulting in higher prices and possibly diminished innovation, and no 
one has ever measured those harms against whatever consumer benefits 
supposedly flow from allowing firms to become too-big-to-fail.179
C. THE PROBLEM OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
  Thus, 
even if it would be a paradox of one sort to impose antitrust-based limits 
on some corporate size, it may equally be a paradox of another sort not 
to – even viewing antitrust myopically as concerned with nothing except 
output, price and innovation. 
Post-Chicago antitrust contains yet another paradox, or at least an 
inconsistency worthy of further study: optimum scale efficiency is 
considered measurable and a presentable basis for allowing a merger 
transaction, but excessive-scale inefficiency is not considered a proper 
basis on its own for disallowing a merger.  That is, no court or agency 
has ever blocked a merger on the exclusive grounds of scale 
diseconomies, let alone that the merged entity would be too big to fail – 
there has to be another basis for antitrust to intervene.  The reverse no 
longer holds true since the revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
in 1997.180
 
 179. Rosch, supra note 20. 
  The Guidelines now provide for a quantitative assessment of 
merger specific efficiencies, and indicate that the agencies will consider 
such efficiencies as capable of offsetting some potential adverse 
competitive effects of a merger.  Although the Guidelines acknowledge 
that efficiencies “are difficult to verify,” they invite merger proponents 
to “substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify by 
reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted 
efficiency.”  Nowhere do the Guidelines attempt to quantify or address 
the consumer harm that can result when an otherwise benign merger 
 180. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4. 
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creates an out-sized merged enterprise of inefficient scale. 
Diseconomies of scale can harm consumer welfare just as much as 
the prevention of economies of scale.  Diseconomies of scale result 
when a firm’s marginal cost begins to exceed long-run average costs.181  
This can occur when a firm’s size becomes so unwieldy that each 
additional unit of production costs more than the one before.  Among the 
many causes that have been studied include the tendency for large 
organizations to isolate decision makers from the results of their 
decisions182 – a familiar theme in recent discussions about corporate 
compensation excesses divorced from performance measures.  Other 
causes of diseconomies of scale in large enterprises include increased 
communications costs, duplication of effort, inertia, and internal culture 
clashes.183
This may add one more justification for antitrust to address itself to 
some too-big-to-fail problems.  Although current antitrust rules do 
nothing to preserve smaller enterprise for its own sake, even the 
narrowest economic doctrinal underpinnings may support doing so in 
some limited circumstances. 
  By definition, when a firm exceeds optimum scale, each 
additional unit produced costs more, and consumers pay the price for 
that.  Why is it that optimal scale efficiency is measurable and 
constitutes a proper consideration to permit a transaction and overcome 
some anticompetitive potential, yet diseconomies of scale are not 
considered worthy of any sort of antitrust inquiry at all (other than 
perhaps to rebut claims of scale economies)? 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Antitrust is quintessentially addressed to the optimum organization 
of the nation’s economy, even if it does not purport to address all aspects 
of it.  The central concern of antitrust law is economic power and its 
potential to be misused.  Vast aggregations of economic power in 
convergence with other phenomena cause too-big-to-fail crises.  It 
therefore stands to reason that antitrust ought to be concerned with some 
 
 181. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 532.  A seminal explanation of so-
called “X-inefficiency” is found at Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-
Efficiency,” 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 392 (1966). 
 182. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 532. 
 183. Id. 
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aspects of the too-big-to-fail problem, at least insofar as the problem 
stems from aggregated economic size and power.  Since the too-big-to-
fail problem is complex, it is unsurprising that antitrust alone is not the 
cure, but it could make a difference by controlling certain forms of 
conduct that lead to firms becoming excessively large. 
The foregoing considerations lead to a few conclusions and 
proposals for bringing antitrust into the public policy discussion about 
preventing or limiting the need for public rescues of private firms that 
are too big, too interconnected and perhaps too powerful to be allowed 
to fail. 
A. EXISTING ANTITRUST MERGER LAW COULD HELP PREVENT  
SOME OUT-SIZED COMBINATIONS 
Antitrust law reaches a range of business practices, and many of 
them (such as price discrimination) are unlikely ever to have any role in 
the creation of a too-big-to-fail crisis.  The most relevant prohibitions 
relate to mergers.  Although some firms become too-big-to-fail by 
internal growth, the public has at times been forced to rescue some firms 
that grew by merger activity.  It is perfectly appropriate for antitrust law 
to consider whether a merger transaction threatens consumer harm.  The 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are currently under review, and 
some attention might be paid in the final product to the problems related 
to combinations that create merged entities that are too-big-to-fail.  
Although too-big-to-fail is not central to most merger analysis, 
enormous consumer harm has resulted from allowing corporate growth 
to create so many indispensible firms.  Put differently, since size 
contributes to the problem, controlling size might contribute to a 
solution.  A few ways exist in which antitrust law might more 
assertively intervene to control the population growth in the too-big-to-
fail category of businesses. 
1. Diseconomies of Scale in Merger Analysis 
Mergers could be reviewed under a modified standard that takes 
into account the possibility that the merged entity will simply be too big 
measured by its own economics.  Since consumer harm in the form of 
higher prices and reduced output can result from allowing a firm to 
achieve a scale that exceeds the optimum, here is one place where 
antitrust might play a role without much adaptation from its current 
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approach.  However, this is a controversial proposal, to be sure, because 
the Clayton Act only prohibits combinations whose effects “may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,” and 
theoretically a firm could exceed optimum scale without doing either of 
those things.184
Another objection would be that the government ought not to 
intervene in the entrepreneurial process by dictating optimum scale 
instead of allowing the marketplace to decide.  If a firm decides to grow 
to a certain size in the hope of obtaining a competitive advantage, it may 
be argued that the government should not determine that such a 
marketplace gamble is inefficient.  Notably, other types of likely 
inefficient results of mergers are already taken into account in orthodox 
merger review.  For example, it is understood that a profit maximizing 
monopoly may be willing to spend resources inefficiently to retain its 
monopoly position, such as through various forms of costly predation, 
so long as the costs do not exceed the monopoly profits.  Also, those 
who will argue that the government has no business deciding the 
optimum scale of private enterprise need to explain why the efficiencies 
provisions added to the 1992 Guidelines do not run afoul of the same 
principle.  If economists can take measurements to assure the public that 
a business combination will achieve scale efficiencies sufficient to offset 
presumptive monopoly power, they ought equally to be able to warn the 
public that another merger would move the combined firm beyond the 
optimal scale.  The standard analysis of merger-specific efficiencies is a 
complex one, but its basic arithmetic is simple enough: the presumptive 
monopoly deadweight welfare loss is calculated to be a number that is 
less than the combined firm’s reduction in cost-per-unit times the 
number of units produced.
  There will also be disagreement about what constitutes 
efficient scale, as is already a matter of public debate about the size of 
the nation’s four largest banks.  Still, sometimes a firm’s becoming very 
large and inefficient will dampen competition and place upward pressure 
on prices, and that should be of concern to antitrust agencies and courts. 
185
 
 184. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), is not 
limited by the language of the Clayton Act. 
  The converse should be no more difficult 
 185. Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the efficiencies “defense” only comes into 
play where the transaction is presumptively anticompetitive based on the structural and 
behavioral analysis set forth in the Guidelines.  This means that efficiencies as a defense 
is only calculated where there is at least a presumption of post-merger market power 
sufficient to reduce output, raise prices and thus create a monopoly “deadweight welfare 
loss.”  MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4. 
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or speculative.  Of course, just as scale efficiencies are difficult for 
merger proponents to quantify, those opposing a combination on 
inefficiency grounds should bear a similar burden.  Oftentimes, the 
burden may turn out to be too great, in which case a diseconomies of 
scale filter would do no good.  However, a diseconomies of scale filter 
would not appear to do any harm and it might prevent some out-sized 
combinations that create inefficient firms. 
2. Too-Big-to-Fail as a Factor in Merger Analysis 
A second proposal that would entail little or no adjustment of 
current antitrust economics dogma is to incorporate the too-big-to-fail 
problem itself into merger review standards.  This was Commissioner 
Rosch’s idea,186
 
 186. See, Rosch, supra note 20. 
 which he acknowledged to be a provocative one.  
However, the controversy is not one about the basic economics of Post-
Chicago antitrust.  Assuming a merger presents a palpable prospect of 
creating a firm that cannot be allowed to fail under conditions where 
failure can be foreseen, the threat of antitrust-type consumer harm from 
the transaction may meet the standard of incipiency under Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act.  For example, the recent 
banking industry mergers that were permitted as a sort of private bailout 
of the acquired banks could be analyzed along these lines.  In 
appropriate cases, it would seem to do no violence to current Post-
Chicago antitrust law and policy to block such mergers on these 
grounds, since consumer harm via reduced output, higher prices and 
impaired innovation are uncontroversial objects of antitrust sanctions.  
Again, quantifying the threat to consumer harm may be daunting and the 
burden of establishing such a likelihood should not be a light one since 
the likelihood that any particular firm will at some point meet all of the 
criteria of a too-big-to-fail enterprise is not a routine conclusion.  A firm 
might present only a very remote too-big-to-fail threat at the time it 
proposes a merger, and that threat might not materialize until it is too 
late for antitrust intervention under existing antitrust theory.  One can 
anticipate any number of problems, but the concept remains a sound 
one: allowing firms to merge into a size that could not be allowed to fail 
through normal bankruptcy proceedings presents a threat to consumer 
welfare that is indistinguishable from the harms that flow from mergers 
we already block for other reasons.  If one of the nation’s four largest 
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banks proposed to combine with another large financial services firm, 
would it be too much to ask whether a non-publicly funded resolution 
would be feasible if their liabilities were to become unmanageable?  It is 
the rare merger that ought to present such a question, and, in those few 
contexts, the question seems an appropriate one to consider. 
B. TOWARDS A PARTIAL RESTORATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 
It is time to set aside the myth that antitrust law has always had as 
its sole objective the optimum allocation of productive resources and to 
restore to antitrust the policies that were jettisoned by the Chicago 
School by including reference to these broader policies in formulating 
and applying antitrust rules.  It is modern mythology to suggest that 
antitrust was never intended to limit the economic and political power of 
the trusts.  That myth was merely one of the arguments, and not the most 
forceful, for moving antitrust into a laissez-faire posture that trusted 
markets to make better decisions than the courts or agencies.  The 
primary Chicago School objection to older antitrust policy, the real 
“antitrust paradox,” was that it rewarded inefficient market participants 
with antitrust remedies exacted from their more efficient rivals.  This 
paradox does not need to be revived in antitrust law.  Rather, what ought 
to be restored in antitrust rules are those policies that were directed at 
protecting consumers, traders, democratic institutions and the economy 
against the perils of excessive concentrations of corporate economic 
power.  While courts and agencies never explicitly repudiated these non-
economic antitrust policy objectives, they have ignored and, at times, 
disparaged them.  Competitor collaborations, conduct of monopolies and 
potentially catastrophic mergers should be subject to antitrust review 
that takes these other policies into account. 
The too-big-to-fail public policy problem directly intersects with 
these other antitrust values, while almost not at all overlapping with 
allocative efficiency concerns.  Perhaps the core value of antitrust is its 
preference for marketplace activity to serve the needs of consumers.  
However, when firms are rescued through public bailouts, the 
government almost inevitably must intrude into the machinery of the 
marketplace – just the result antitrust seeks to avoid.  That alone would 
form a reasonable basis for objecting on antitrust grounds to the 
formation of a too-big-to-fail firm.  Thus, a central tenet of antitrust 
should favor some control to prevent the combination of firms into too-
big-to-fail companies whose indispensability poses a risk of displacing 
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normal marketplace activity with ad hoc crisis-driven government 
intervention.  Antitrust ought to block a proposed merger that would 
create a firm exceeding maximum optimal scale and whose failure, if it 
occurred, would foreseeably require government bailout intervention. 
Furthermore, antitrust’s political policy recognizes a threat to 
democratic institutions that has considerable resonance today.  When 
firms become so large that they cannot be allowed to fail, they also tend 
to have disproportionate power over the political process.  For example, 
a perception exists that the mega-banks formed via a combination of 
bail-outs and mergers significantly influenced Congressional reform of 
financial services regulation.  A Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for the 
New York Times observed: “Three years into the crisis, we are no closer 
to reining in too-powerful-to-fail companies or eliminating the risks that 
they pose to taxpayers.”187
Antitrust also seeks to protect the freedom of traders to do business 
without anticompetitive interference or exclusion from the marketplace.  
Klor’s
  Had the original intent of the Sherman Act 
been considered in connection with the recent perplexing decision to 
solve the too-big-to-fail problem by creating even bigger banks, perhaps 
a different and more tempered outcome might have emerged from the 
process. 
188 makes a most interesting case in point.  That case involved 
allegations that a rival retailer formed a conspiracy with manufacturers 
to boycott and ruin the plaintiff.189  The boycott was held to fall within 
the per se prohibitions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.190  Yet, Klor’s 
was a single retailer in a competitive market served by sufficiently many 
others such that no allocative efficiency justification exists for the result 
in that case.191  Indeed, the complaint under review in that case might 
not withstand a motion to dismiss under the newer standards for Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12192
 
 187. Gretchen Morgenson, Future Bailouts of America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, 
at 1. 
 in force today, since it was implausible 
that the manufacturers would have any incentive to collude with one 
another to exclude a customer from the market.  In any event, under the 
Post-Chicago view, Klor’s was wrongly decided because consumers 
 188. Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
 189. Id., at 209. 
 190. Id., at 212-14. 
 191. Id. 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 12.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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were not harmed by having one less retailer in a densely populated 
retailer marketplace.  Still, what is objectionable about a rule that 
prohibits rivals from joining together to force another enterprise out of 
business, even if consumers do not pay higher prices as a result of the 
exclusion?  Assuming the truth of the allegations, Klor’s was deprived 
of the freedom to conduct business.  Until the Chicago School, a public 
policy against the very deprivation of such freedom formed a part of 
anti-monopoly law since at least the Case of Monopolies in 1603.193
The policy of protecting the freedom of traders also plays a part in 
the too-big-to-fail discussion, because the moral hazard problem places 
the mega-enterprise at a distinctly unfair advantage that could prevent 
smaller rivals from thriving.  How, for example, could a small bank 
offer competitive terms on credit transactions if its largest rivals in the 
same market have the ability to take risks whose downside potential is 
backed by the United States Treasury?  This policy, if considered, would 
bring yet another consideration into play in evaluating a small number of 
mergers that present a plausible too-big-to-fail risk. 
  It is 
no objection to such a rule to say that inefficient rivals whose failure is 
their own fault will try to blame others and sue them on trumped up 
antitrust claims.  Courts can and should decide whether defendants 
colluded or not.  If they have colluded to drive someone out of the 
market, it seems a reasonable and time-honored public policy to give the 
victim a remedy at law, regardless of whether consumers paid higher 
prices as a consequence. 
C. LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITY 
Further amending antitrust law to block the formation of a too-big-
to-fail firm would be consistent with the original intent of the Sherman 
Act, and certainly with intervening enactments, such as the Celler-
Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act.  Additionally, amending the 
Clayton Act to permit the break-up of a firm that has grown to such 
proportions might move antitrust in a novel direction.  These sorts of 
legislative enactments are under consideration, and it is beyond the 
scope of this article to draw a conclusion as to whether public policy 
would be well or ill served by their enactment.  However, if a too-big-to-
fail statute were to be enacted, the foregoing discussion suggests that 
doing so would only do violence to very recent antitrust orthodoxy, but 
 
 193. See Darcy v. Allin, 77 E.R. 1260 (1601). 
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would not offend historic and original policies behind American 
antitrust law.  The presence of these oversized enterprises, whose 
numbers are growing, threatens the political system because their 
indispensability makes them nearly impossible to govern.  It also 
menaces important markets with the uneven playing field created by the 
moral hazard problem.  Moreover, the presence of oversized enterprises 
poses the risk of unusually catastrophic harm to vast numbers of 
consumers and the public treasury.  These are concerns that certainly are 
not new to antitrust. 
 
